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PREFACE 
Basically, this thesis is divided into two parts:. 
1) A theory section •• ·., Chapters 1 - 6. 
2) A 1950 to 1958 •history' section • "' •• Ohapters 7 - 15. 
'.rheory.Section 
A) Interest rate theory 
In chapters l ;.;._ 4 t'le intend to introduce the following: 
Oh. l) A short presentation of the Keynesian interest theory. 
Ob~ 2) A short presentation of th_e loanable fUnds theory. 
Ch. ') An elaboration of: the saving-expenditure process for 
life insurance. 
Oh,. 4) The determination of the theory with which life insurance 
can be associated. 
The purpose of the first four chapters is stated under item ( 4). 
B) Interest rate changes 
In cha.pters_5~d6we presents 
Ch,. 5) The reactio:q_ of life insurance companies to changes in 
the rate of in~erest,. 
Ch. 6) A dynamic'model whichshows the stability of the supply 
·of loanable funds by life insUrance companies for the 
period 1950 to· 1958.· 
The purpose of chapters 5 and 6 is to shol't holt changes in the 
i 
rate of' interestafi'ect: 
a) the_supply of' loanable. ftmds by life insurance companies; 
b) the composition of theirportf'olios. 
'History' Section. 
In chapters 7 - 15 we take those types of securities which make up 
a life insurance portfolio such as Government bonds, industrial 
bonds, mortgages, etc., and examine how the life insurance industry 
adjusted its portfolios from 1950 to 1958 as the_ rate of interest 
changed. In other words, we attempt a correia.tionof interest rate 
changes \otith the sales and purchases ·of: securities. 
Conclusions 
The conclusions i"thich can be drawn from this thesis are: 
1) Life insurance companies are properly associated with the 
loanable ftmds theory. 
2) They are.ma.inly concerned with the long-term rate.of interest. 
5) The industry is sensitive to changes in the Treasury bill rate. · 
4) Oha.riges in rates cause no substantial change in the supply 
of loanable funds. 
5) Nei"r savings and funds rel·ea.sed fro~ redemptions are channelled 
into investment opportunities which promise higher returns. 
The industry does not, however, sell securities already in 
its portfolios to effect adjustments in the ·face of interest 
rate changes~ · 
H.E. 
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Chapter 1 
The Keynesian Liquidity Preference Theory. 
In this chapter we wish to give a short description of the determination 
. of the rate of interest under Keynesian premisses. 
i'le shall endeavor to stress only those points which are of importance 
to the comparative analysis which is undertaken in chapters ;> and 4. 
* 
Let us start off with the proposition that interest is a monetary 
phenomenon. Monetary in the sense that the rate of interest is 
determined by the demand for, and the supply of, money. 
Money is demanded because it is the only perfectly liquid asset. 
People, who need money for personal and business reasons, and do not 
possess it, are willing to pay a price for its use. 
Before a holder of money will surrender the advantages that attach 
to the ownership of the only perfectly liquid asset, he must be paid 
a reward. Interest, therefore, is the reward for parting with 
liquidity.l 
The rate of interest is determined by the strength of the preference 
for liquidity in relation to the quantity of money available. 
The higher the liquidity preference, the higher the rate of interest 
that is offered; and the greater the quantity of money, the lower the 
rate of interest that is demanded. A decrease in liquidity preference 
1 Keynes, J.M., 'The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money', 
N.Y., Harcourt, Brace & Oo., 19;>6, p. 167. 
·, 
2 
will tend to lower the rate of interest. and a decrease in the quantity 
of money \Y'ill tend to raise .the rate o:f interest. 
The rate of interest, like any other price in the market, is established 
at. a level at which the demand will be equilibrated with supply. 
According to \'that has been said above,. an increase in the rate of 
interest means that a larger reward is paid for not-hoarding. 
I:f the rate o:f interest did not rise when liquidity preference 
increased, the total amourit of cash the public would wish to hold, 
at the existing rate of interest, would exceed the available supply. 
This condition is shotm in Figure ·.1. 
i 
i 0 
I 
When liquidity preference shifts fro:m L2 to L2, the rate of interest 
increases from i~ to ib, the supply of money being constant at~· 
If the rate o:f interest is 1forced 1 to remain at the level i 0 , e.g., 
through the intervention of monetary authorities, weobtain a point 
I . . .· ic on the L2 schedule. However, the ic position can only be maintained 
t if the amount of money is increased to Sm. In case the supply of 
money remains constant, the only possible movement of the rate of 
interest is toward ib. 
_j 
Since, in the Keynesian system, the quantity of money is the other 
factor which, along with the degree of liquidity preference, determines 
the rate of interest, it is possible for the monetary authority to 
meet an increase in the desire of the public to hold money with an 
actual increase in the supply of money.1 Figure l shows that when the 
quantity of money is increased, in proportion to the rising 
liquidity preference, the rate of interest will not rise. 
Following Keynes, 2 we shall differentiate between transaction, 
precautionary, and speculative motives. 
We assume that the total amount of mone,y which is demanded is a 
function of income and the rate of interest:; 
M : L(Y, i). ( 1 ) 
The component M contains money which is demanded for the transaction 
and precautionary motives, M1, and for the ~peculative motive, M2, 
such that 
( 2 ) 
Money, which is put aside for transactions and for precautionary 
purposes,does not depend on the rate of interest but on income. 
Therefore, 
M1 = k(Y) ( ; ) 
~ General Theory, ibid., chapter 1;. 
General Theory, ibid., p. 170. 
; Hicks, J.R., 1Mr. Keynes and the Olassics 1 ,.Econometrica, 19;7. 
4 
where k is a parameter. 
M2 , on the other hand, is functionally related to the rate of interest 
and we have 
( 4 ) 
When we add both functions we obtain 
L(Y,i) = k(Y) + L2(i). ( 5 ) 
It should be clear that the parameter k of k(Y) is not a constant 
coefficient but changes with rising or falling levels of income. 
Also, M1 is not completely independent of the rate of interest. 
This relationship has been. shown traditionally by plotting M1 
against the rate of interest where the schedule is inelastic over 
its relevant portion but tilts to the left at high interest rates. 
L2(i) in Keynes' structure is a monotonically decreasing function 2 
of the rate of interest but has two important properties at its 
limits. 
In the first place there is a value of i, say i 1 , such that 
( 6 ) 
For there must be for every individual some minimum net yield 
per income period that will induce him to part entirely with money 
as an asset. Hence1 if he can find securities which, by holding them 
1 Kurihara, K.K., 
2 Modigliani, F., 
'Introduction to Keynesian Dynamics', N.Y., Columbia 
University, 1956, p. 67. 
'Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and 
Money•, Econometrica, 1944. . 
for a given number of income periods, result in a net yield equal 
or larger than the minimum, his demand for money will approach zero. 
Since this is true £or every individual, there must be some system 
of interest rates which is sufficient to reduce the aggregate demand 
£or money to zero.1 
The second characteristic is more peculiar. Since securities are an 
inferior way of hold.ing assets, compared \"lith money, it is recognized 
that there must be some minimum rate of interest, say i2, at which 
nobody \'rill be willing 'to hold nonphysical assets except in the 
form of money. ~·then this level is reached, the demand for money to 
be held in balances becomes absolute and the rate of interest cannot 
fall any lower. Hence, 
t 
L2(i) = «>·~or i ~ i2• (7) 
Both conditions are familiar to us. The first one is met by giving 
the liquidity preference schedule a finite axis intercept while the 
second condition results in a horizontal line at a very lo\'1' rate 
of interest which Keynes assumed to be about 2%.2 
The limits are shmm graphically in Figure 2.} 
~ Modigliani, F., ibid., section 5. 
Keynes, ibid., p. 202. 
;5 The. 2 marginal, or limiting cases, 
From equation (1) we obtain di/dY 
denote partial derivatives. 
Then, 
di/dY. = 0 
can be stated more accurately. 
= -Ly/ Li, where the subscripts 
if I L1 I = oo and ( 8 ) 
5 
6 
It has become general practice to follow Hicks in the determination 
of the short-term rate of interest.1 
Hicks sho\..rs a final schedule in t'lhieh the rate of interest is on 
the ordinate and income on the abscissa. A·particular rate of interest, 
say, i 0 , is determined by the intersection of an IS curve ~tith a 
liquidity preference curve. 
However, it is often forgotten that in the General Theory - in 
contrast to the Treatise - it is the marginal efficiency of' capital 
that adjusts to the money rate of interest rather than the other way 
around.2 Therefore, we shall disregard the Hioksian schedule and 
proceed to determine the short-run rate of interest with as few 
variables as possible. 
We also assume that the supply of' money is constant in terms of 
stocks of money and not in terms of flows. 
Then the supply of money, s2, is the portion which is not needed 
for transactions. This means that 
s2 - n.1 k(Y) ( 9 ) 
-
L2(i) . =· M k(Y) ( 10 ) 
L2(i) 
- s2• ( 11 ) 
-
'r'le reach a position of equilibrium when ind_ividuals are willing 
to hold for an income period all the available supply of money, 
S2• This situation is shown in Figure ~. 
In this diagram we replace t.he complex system of interest rat.es 
1 
2 Hicks, J.Re, ibid. Dillard, D., 1The Economics of J.r-1~ Keynes', Prentice Hall, p. 198. 
i 
s 
. ~' 
(Y ) ~ 
s2 
·Figure 2 
sl 
that exists in practice by a single rate, i. 
L2 is t.he demand curve for money to hold, sloping downward and to 
t.he right.. The vertical lines are various supply curves of money 
for inactive purposes corresponding to different values of income 
and a constant amount of total, money. · 
As income increases, the supply for inactive purposes falls. 
This is so because the total .. is fixed and because a higher income 
requires a larger amoUnt of money for transactions. 
Hence, the following inequality should be noticed in the diagram: 
7 
Equation (10) - 42(i) = ·M - k(Y) indicates that L2 is small 
\'then Y :J,s large and i must rise considerably to get wealth-holders 
t.o part with money.· 
8 
As shown in Figure 2, the direct determinants of' the rate of' interest 
are the liquidity preference and the supply of' money \i'hich is held idle10 
·Although this result·is correct in the Keynesian sense, we should 
realize that bothvariables- liquidity preference and supply of' money-
are not independent. Liquidity preference depends on the speculative 
motive which again is ,a function of several variables such as economic 
activity, expectations, etc •• The supply of money also depends on 
economic activity which in turn is a function of consumption and 
investment. However, for our purposes, the exposition through L2 
and M2 which is given in Figure 2 is sufficient:. 
This concludes our analysis of the Keynesian theory with the exception 
of' one additional point that should be emphasized,. viz., the composition 
of' money. Keynes does, in general, include time deposits as money.1 
However, it is doubtful whether savings that are made in the form of' 
life insurance, can be considered money or even near-money. There are 
several reasons.f'or this. First, even though policy loans can be obtained 
quite easily, usually a certain period of' time and effort is required 
to negotiate such loans. Secondly, policy loans have to be repaid in 
order to receive full payment of' the face amount of' the policy. 
Individuais have to pay interest for loans to the insurance company • 
.If we assume that we are. close to.i2 in Figure·2, the actual rate of' 
interest to the individual \'tould become negative were he only t9 borrow 
to satisfy his demand for liquidity. 
1 Dillard, ibid., p. 18;. 
Keynes was more c_oncerned with the individual1 while we shall give 
emphasis to life insurance companies a_s insti ~utions repr_esentin.g · 
aggregates of individuals. This makes-a considerable difference as we 
shall see in chapter 4. 
9 
For purposes of summarization, the follolting points should be stressed 
.which are important .tor subsequent a.na.lyses: 
{1) liqUidity preference and supply of money determine the rate of 
interest; 
(2) the schedule of liquidity. preference has two limiting values; 
. (;) injecti'ons of money into the economy within the limits change 
the rate of interest; 
(4) changes of liquidity preference have ·a'oertain impact on the 
bond.·market in~smu:ch bonds are either bol.lght or sold. 
· 
1 0' Leary, J., 1 The Institutional Savings-Investment Process and 0t.U"rent 
Economic Theory', AER, March 1954, pp~ 455-470, Proceed. 
Ohapter 2 
_The Robertsonia.n.Loanable Funds Theory. 
'Xhe title .is somewhat misleading in the sense that the loanable :funds 
theory cannot solely be ascribed to Robertson. A number of people 
contributed to i~s Pl'esent formulation such as. Hawtrey, Ohlin, and 
Hicks.1 
Roberts_on 1 s name has been used" because he has spoken most ,eloquently 
. for the loanable funds theory and given one of the best statements of 
. the theory. 2 
·* 
· · Only a few years before 19;57, econqmii;lts, on being q~estioned what 
determined the rate of interest, .would-have unanimously replied 
that it was determined by the supply a.nd ,demand for, capital. 
. . 
.. ~1ha.t the concept of capital stood for, was less clear. Did it mean 
real capital, in the sense of concrete good$? If so, theforces 
goyerning the rate of interest are reduced to technical and 
. ' 
psychological components and we.havea theory such as has been 
elab~rated by Boehm-Bawerk.3 Or did capitalmea.n money capital, 
in the sense of loanable funds - the power to dispose of a given 
1 Keynes, J.M., 1A1 ter.native Theories of the Rate of Interest 1 , E.J.: . 
2 June 19~7. .· 
Rejoinders by Ohli~, Robertson, Hawtrey in E.J., Sept. 19;57 •. · 
2 Keynes, J.r.i., 1The Ex-Ante Theory of the Rate of<tnterest1 , E.J. 19~7 • 
.; Rob.ertson, D.H., 1Essays in Monetary Theory', Staples .Press 194o. · 
.· Boehm•Ba\'lerk, E., 1Positive Theorie des Kapita1s 1 , F.'.X. Weiss. 
ll 
quantity of money? There is a great difference depending on l'thich point 
of viev-r we take. According to Hicksl, · 6niY. one side can· be right. 
Afte~ .the appearance o:f Keynesi General Theory, the emphasis was laid 
more on the second interpretation ( a.lth?ugh the're are .some· outsta.n<ling 
economists who emphasize the ·first 'version 2 ·).. 
Keynes split the monetary theorists·into two camps by holding that 
· ·the rate of interest: is not determined by the supply· and demand for 
loanable funds; but rath~r by the supply and demand for money itself .::s . 
. . . . 
In dealing tlith life insurance companies, we immediately have in mind . 
. . . 
· the huge funds of money \·thich are at their disposal. A 1 real 1 interest 
theory.:which discounts money as \.tnimportant_clearly is not adequate.· 
for our purposes. We are therefore interested iri a. 'monetary' t.ileory 
. ... . . . . 
. and to discover ho\'1 the loanable funds theory integrates money, 
hoarding, and saving into a. theory of interest determination is 
the task of this chapter., 
* 
In this theory, the rate of interest is determined by th.e.dema.nd and 
supply of' loanable funds. 
i'le may state first those factors which influence the. supply of' 
loanable fundse 
Part of the supply is made up of savings. An individuai saves if he 
. does not spend all ·of his inc~me -which he received in the preceding 
~ Hicks, J.R., Value and Capital; OXford, Clarendon Press, 19;59, p. 15:;. 
Samuelson, Paul A., An Introductory Analysis to Economics, McGraw-
~. Hill Co., N.Y., 1958, P• 581. 
"' Keynes, General Theory, chapter 1:;. 
· .... 12 
.. 
period for the purchase of goods and se~vices in the pr~sent period. 
. ~ .. . 
Total savings for the economy. as a whole a.nl6unt to the total money 
income earned in the preceding period, less money spent for consumption 
in the present period. 
In· symbolic forill. 
( 1 ) 
Income of the present period is made up of consumption and investment 
and we have 
-
-
( 2 ) 
Therefore, if It · :; . St then Yt-l must. be equal to Yt; if It>' St then 
Yt )Yt-l; and finally if It< St then 'Yt.;;.l>Yt• Equations (1) and (2) 
and their implications .are·lmown as the }tobertsoniari·vel"sion of savings, 
in contrast to the Keynesian· form which states that saving is not a 
function of the last income period but rather of the present one. 
In other uords, Keynes does not lag his equations.! 
Aside from individuais, there are, \-iha.t might .be called, the savings 
of business corporations. Companies, instead of paying·out all their 
earnings as money incomes,,retain part of them f'or investment 
purposes. In sYlllbola 
( ~. ) 
>-there ~stands .for profit, and d for .dividends paid out. 
Since these savings do take place within a firm.for definite purposes, 
they do not appear on the. supply side of the market for loanable funds. 
1 
Keynes, ibid., pp. 61-65; A. Hansen, 1Guide to Keynes •, pp. 48-49,59-64. · 
i1e knol'l, however, that such funds are not kept in the form o:r cash 
but we may expect that business savings are used to keep larger inventories 
or that theyare offered in themarket for short periods of time. 
Saving minus dissaving releases funds .·which co:r3,stitute part of the 
total oft:er o:r loanable funds to the market. In other words; these 
are hoards or money which bas been saved in the past. 
There is a presumption that t:hetransfer o:r savings takes·place with 
only a minor time lag. This follows from the consideration that 
interest is paid onmoney which would mean a loss of opportunity 
. . ' . . . 
income if the time lag were large. However, . it has happened that 
liquidity motives are so strong thatinterest losses .are no deterrent 
.. 
to increased cash balances.l Taldng money as a whole, this would 
. result in a deerease in the velocity of money; or, in.other words•, 
K in the Cambridge equation becomes larger.2 
~1e may say that hoarding ·decreases the 'supply of loanable. funds, 
and conversely, unless the monetary authorities inject more money 
into the system. 
Another source of loanable funds :i.s amortization,. or depreciation, 
• 0 • 
depending on 'l'rhether we have intangibles or physical assets. 
. . 
Althoug~ amortizatiort~d depreciation quotas are excluded from 
net savings, they can justly be included in gross savings. 
Money set aside f'or t~e maintenance of eapital hasm~ny of' the 
. . 
qualities of anew supply of' lo~~ble .fundi!J• 
1 Keynes,- General Theory, p. · 207. 2 . Robertson, D•H., 1A Note on the. Theory of:·Money', Economica, 
pp. 24? - 247; also in Readings in Monetary Theory~ 
14 
Lastly, we should mention the impact of public policy on consumption 
and savings decisions. Outstanding among these are taxes, social 
security reserves, old age benefits, etc •• 
* 
Before we can derive a schedule of loanable funds we need to know 
more than what makes up the supply of loanable funds. 
Therefore,we shall examine what lies behind the 'schedules' of demand 
and supply of'~·loanable funds. 
The demand for funds is either a demand for consumers' or a demand 
for producers' credit. However, this distinction does not point by 
itself to the close relationship of the two concepts. We know that 
the investment demand of entrepreneurs is not a demand for investment 
goods for the sake of investment goods but a derived demand depending 
on the demand for consumers' goods. Therefore, we may assume that 
demand for consumers 1 credit does elicit without considerable time 
lag a demand for producers' credit too. 
The demand for loanable funds by entrepreneurs depends on the 
anticipated profitability of the planned investment. Conventionally, 
the different investment possibilities can be arranged in a sequence 
of decreasing profitability. The. degree of the profitability 
determines the ea~erness of the competing entrepreneurs to pbtain 
loanable funds and their disposition to pay interest rates_only slightly 
lower than the expected profits, should competition force them to do so.1 
1 This is nothing but the ~~I; or what I. Fisher called 'return over cost~ 
Fisher, I., 1The Theory of Interest', pp. 158-59; Kelley, N.Y~ 
The schedule of 1decreasing profit~bility 1 is_ influenced, in terms 
of its shape and location, by the state of technology, expectations, 
the demand for consumers' goods, the amount and age· of' the existing 
capital stock, and theprices of new capital goods. 
If we assume that the.se variables are given, we can draw a schedule, 
by plotting the rate of int~rest against investments. 
This has been done in Figure ; .. 
i,r 
A 
Figure ; 
. . . 
I.· 
0 
I 
In addition to the rate of' interest, we_ have also shown .. on the 
ordinate the marginal efficiency of' investment, r. 
· Suppose that we are 13.t It• At this ·level .of. investment the 
l:!larginal efficiency of.capital iS high and investments will be 
made until the marginal efficiency has. fa,ll~n to the level. of 
·the rate ~f interest, i 0 ,. uhioh, in the diagram, is the distance 
15 
11 I~. \1e may asin.une, in contrast to earlier mill tiplier-accelerator 
_expositions--by Hicks, Kaldor, Good~rin, Harrod l, that ·the schedule 
. . ~ ' ' . 
- of' decreasing prof'i tabili ty of' -investment is rather· elasti~. 2 
Next \'le may inquire 11hat determines the deme.lld for loanable funds 
16 
by consumers. The ans\·rer i~ that it is the marginal time preference,; 
\·thich; by the 'itay, is Boehm-Bat-1erk1 s second cause for interest to 
be paid. 
>A diagram, such as Figure 4, sho\'fS t.he relationship between today' s 
_.and tomorro\-1 1 s consumption• 
s 
Consumptio 
R Today' s Consumption 
Figure 4 4 · · 
1 Hick~, J .R., 1 A Oontrib't.tt_ion to the- Theory of the Trade Cycle 1 , 1950; _ 
·Hicks, J.R., 'I,~r. Harrod's Dynamic Theory', li;conometrica, 1949; 
Kaldor, U, 1 A !>1odel of' the Trade Cycle 1 , E. J •, 194o; 
Goodtdn in Hansen's 1Business0y.cles and National Income'; 
2 Harrod, R, 'To\'lards a Dynamic Economics', Mac r.1illan 1948, Lect. ;. 
:; ~uesenberry, ~., 'Busin?ss Cyc~es,and Ec• Grot·tth', Ch. 4. 
4 .:lamuelson, P.A., EconomJ.cs, ibJ.d. P• 584. The diagram comes. from Samuelson's Introductory Analysis, p. 584. 
.The equilibrium position inthis diagram results from:: 
( 1) a vertical bias of the transformation curve SRJ · 
(2) a vertic!:!-1 bias of the consumer's indifference curves. 
At the opti~um position E. positive interest is paid because 
the slope of the tangency-equilibrium is lS.rge:r than 1.0. 
Suppose rre had a tangency position at oD, which means that the 
transformation curve and the indifference contours are. symmetrical· 
around the 45° line, then the rate of interest would be zero. 
17 
· This follo~'ls because of the symmetry condition \"lhich says 
that the consumer is no longer biasedin.fav~r ol' present goods 
but regards present and future goods as,·aq~lly desirable • 
. As· far as the supply -schedule is concerned, rre have listed those 
items that make up the supply of loanable funds) 
In addition we should mention that not only the Jnterest rates 
and the income of today detennine.·,the supply. of loanable funds, 
but also the expectations as to future income and to future interest 
rates,. 
.. 
:ve are no•-1 ready to derive the schedule of loanable f'Un.ds and to 
determine the rate of interest. 
Figure 5 shorts such a schedule. 
S, _in 'the diagram, is 'the supply of loanable funds to which we have 
added-depreciation and amortization reserves. 
Iv1 sho\"IB the supply of funds through credit creation. 
Sand M-'toge'ther constitute .the total supply of loanable f'unds. 
1 
p. 11-14. 
i 
--~~--~~----~------------------~-----------------F Fo 
Figure-5 
The line M could include dishoardings which woUld shift it to 
the right. An alternative 'itay, which we have used in this diagram, 
is to subtract dishoarding~ from hoardings and show a net schedule 
on the demand side. 
I, in the diagra.ni, is the investment demand _for loanable funds; 
H the demand for loanable funds for inactive cash balances. 
I and H constitute the total demand for loanable funds. 
The I schedule incl.udes consumers 1 as well as producers 1 demands. 
The I f- H and the M + S lines intersect at R which determines the 
•,.··. 
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market rate of' interest, i 0 • 
The line M shous the am:ount of' money or credit which is in existence 
within a time period. 
Money may come into ·existence without consideration for the rate 
of :interest, in \'lhich case, ~1 .would 'become a vertical line. 
. . . . . . . ., 
. . 
If'; on the other han,d, col'nlllercial hanks hold excess reserves, the 
line may become rather elastic. Inthe case of' contraction by 
monetary authorities, :t-1 would appear in: the .second quadrant as 
a negative magnitude, MJ and S would shift to the west, S1• 
Figure 5 shows essentially the classical concept of'_ interest rate 
determination. Hoifever, :there are important addi tiona and changes 
incorporated in our approach \ihich were absent from the classical 
model. In the classical theory money wa~ generally disregarded· as 
an asset. In other·words, hoarding did not receive any attention.1 
···Even more important, our schedules are influenced not only by the 
. . . . . . 
. rate of' interest, but also by changes .in income. 
' . : . . . . - . 
This.~oncludesour a.rialysis.of.the loanable funds theory. 
. . . ' ' . 
. . 
In chapters ; and 4 we shall exa.n:iine how 'the .rate of interest 
is determined vrhenwe introduce institutions. 
1 Lange, Oscar, 'Studies inr.tathematical Economics', University of 
Chicago Press,.- A Restatement of Say 1s Law.,· 
Chapter ; 
Life InsUrance Theory 
In this chapter we are mainly interested in examining savings for 
life insurance investments by individuals in relation to changes 
in income and the rate of interest. 
The conclusion, which we may state now, is that such savings are 
rather interest inelastic and depend. chiefly on income, as we \'lould 
expect in the caseof precautionary savings,. 
. A life insurance policy is an instrum_ent which serves a dual purpose. 
Firat of all, life insurance provides security of_ income in case of 
death of the wage earner. Clearly, insurance is not used to insure 
against death but rather against the loss of earning power. 
Secondly, it is a form of investment which, by itself,. would be an 
unfavorable investment outlet compared with other opportunities, 
because the-actuarial value o£ the premium payments is reduced by 
the costs of administration. However, in addition to the security 
feature, life insurance offers certain advantages to an investor, 
such as tax savings, 1forced 1 savings, eto ... 
In analysis, we can treat premium payments either as savings or as 
expenditures, depending on whether we choose to look at life 
insurance as an investment or as a necessary precautiona.rytransaction. 
If savings depend on income we may state symbolically the following 
' .. ' ·.. -~ .. 
···-· _.·· .: ' 
functional relationships: 
S : S(Y) 
s( sl' s2, s, •• ; y ) = 0 • 
Or, in terms of expenditures 
0 : C(Y) 
Savings and expenditures are related in the sense that 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
( ; ) 
( 4 ) 
( 5 ) 
Equation (5) shows that savings are regarded as residuals. 
Therefore, strict analysis would require that we should mainly 
be concerned with the expenditure side of premium payments. 
However, it seemed relevant to approach the relatively fixed 
positions of either c1f(Y) or s1f(Y) from investment considerations 
as well. 
* 
The history of the life insurance business seems to indicate that 
the holders of life insurance policies will endeavor to save for 
their premium payments as long as their income permits them to do 
so.
1 We may establish the hypothesis that individuals will ,Pay 
their premiums even after their incomes have declined to such low 
1 The Equitable, History 1859 to 1959, Life Insurance Society of 
the u.s., Appleton- Century- Crofts, Inc., N.Y., chapter 7. 
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levels that they will cease to save for most other purposes. 
We shall assume that the total savings of an individual consist 
of savings in the form of life insurance and all other savings 
such that 
3(Y) 
S(Y) 
= s1f(Y) ~ k{Y), 
= a ( Y) + K, 
or ( 6 ) 
( 7 ) 
where a (Y) are the savings for life insurance and K the savings 
for all other purposes. 
Equation (7) should be rearranged to account for the statement that 
premiums will be paid even when income declines sharply so that 
S(Y) - a ( Y) : K, ( 8 ) 
where K appears as a residual. 
lihen income changes, the parameters S and a assume different values. 
We may expect that at low levels of Y, the coefficient a rises 
proportionally faster than S, whereas at high levels of income, 
S increases faster than a. At very high levels of Y we probably 
have 
S{Y) a ( Y) = K. ( 9 ) 
We may give a graphical re.presentation of the aboye relationships 
such as in Figure 6. 
The 0 curve in this diagram has been drawn for various levels of 
income. The total savings curve, S(Y), has been omitted. 
The curve for life insurance savings, a(Y), is an ascending step 
22 
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Figure6. 
function depending.on various levels ofi~~ome. 
'.>-
Income, in our diagram,,· is real income and is therefore.independent 
of any inflationary trends. 
Although we may assume·that·total savings increase continuously 
as. income goes_up~ the. savings ot an individual for purposes of 
life insurance investment increase· • by jlJ.!Ilps 1 which has been 
indicated by drawing a step function. 
Equation (9) is shown l:ly g;,iving a(Y) zero slope at high levels of 
income. 
obtain anew savings function, b{Y); This ~hangeis due to the 
:ract that an individual, t·rho has insured his. life for a large amount 
at high levels of income, tries tci meet his premium payments after 
income has ·declined,. Only after Y has fallen substanti~lly, will 
adjustments for lot1er premium payments be made. 
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Several reasons account for; what we may call the different .regression 
path, of life insurance savings: 
(1) the adjustment lag in the downswing may be lar~er than in the · 
upswing; 
' ' 
(2) policyholders have the assurance that they can obtain loans 
on their life ins·urance policies at any time; 
(;) psychological reasons ;;hich stem from .the fact that the 
precautionary motive seem5to increase in intensity as 
income declines. 
~1e may assume that even after Y 0 in the. diagram has been passed, 
- ' '; . . . 
' '' ' I 
a. certain amount of life ins\lrttilce savings will be forthcoming 
which is paid by dissavingS.. For example, the Life .Insurance Fact 
Book for 1959, reports of a Survey by the.Survey Research Center 
. . . . . . - . 
of the University of Michigan, which is summarized in Table 1. 
~1e know; that there is a ·low.:..income g:rQup which dissaves and 
which increases and d.ecreases as people move out of it and into 
it! As far as Table 1 is concerned, we may· assume that the income 
' ' ' 
recipients \'li thin the range 0 - ,$ ~2,000 belong to the group which 
l ' ' ' ' . Kuznets, s., National Income and its Composition ,. 1919-1938, 
NBER, 1941, chapter 7. 
.~ .. -
Table 1 
Family Characteristics of Life Insurance Ownership in 1956 
Income of Family: % of Families insured: Average Premium Payments 
Insured FamiliesJ 
under $ 1,000 4;% $6o 
1,000 - 1,999 55 6o 
2,000 - 2,999 67 85 
;,ooo - ;,999 81 105 
4,ooo - 4,999 91 120 
5,000 - 7,499 95 185 
7,500 or over 96 44o 
all Families 79 190 
Sourcel Life Insurance Fact Book for 1959. 
Table 2 
Assets and Premium Patments of Families in 1956 
Liquid Assets of Familiess 
None 
$ l - 199 
200 - 499 
500 - 999 
1,000 - 1,999 
2,000 - 4,999 
5,000 and over 
All Families 
Average Premium Payments: 
190 
205 
215 
475 
190 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book for 1959 
---.-. ------------~----~- . .----·~-------·-----··---~--- .. 
. , •. · 
. ·~ ·. 
-~~~' 
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of 
i 
._) 
dissaves •. 
* 
In terms of' expenditures we may use an.indif'f'erence curve analysis 
to show the relationship bettfeen income and expenditures• 
Figure.'? 
Figure 7 shows an Engel 1.s curve for life insurance expenditures 
with a separate regression path~ 
Table l shows, what we. expect, .that the higher the level of income, 
the higher the expenditures.f'or life insurance.., 
Table ' 9 gives ah indica~ion as to the professional groups and 
their premium payments. 
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Table 3 · 
Distribution. ·of Life Insurance as to Professional Groups 
1956 
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Occupation of Family Head: % of Families Insured: .Average Premium 
Payments: 
Professional 90% $ 290 
Managerial, Self-Employed 
.92 415 
Clerical, Sales 89 185 
Skilled, Semi-Skilled 88 l4o 
Unskilled -12 95 
Farm Operators 57 1;o 
Other 6o 105 
All Fa.mil ies 79 190 
Source: . L.ife Insurance Fact Book, 1959 
' .• 
\·le have .taken the data from Table 1 and plotted them on Charts 1 
According to equation (9) we a$sU1ne that. the curve of Chart 1 
flattens out at high lev.els of income. 
It is ~vident, from: Chart 2, that the percentage in premium payments 
of income declines rapidly within the range 0 to $ 2,000 and then 
slopes off gently to the right •. The curve remains asymptotic to 
the abscissa. 
The reason for the sharp d;rop in Ohart 2 may be an element of 
indivisibility in li~e insurance, viz., minimum unitlil of $ 1,000 
each., 
Premium 
·pa.rents 
100 
I 
1 
Premium 
2 ; 
· ... as % of Income r~ts 
16 . .·· 
14 '1 . 
12 
10 . 
8 
6 
4 
2 
1 2 ; 
4 5-
.. 
4 5 
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Up to no\V', income has been the indep(;)ndent variable which determined 
the amounts to be saved or spent on life·insu:rance. In ou:r analysis 
we have employed partial equilibrium methods which involved a number 
- -
of ceteris paribus assumptions of which _one was that the rate of' interest 
remained constant·. Now we inquire -ho\"1 · expendi tu:res or savings for life 
insurance change uhen the rate of interest fluctuates, income 
being given. 
In Figu:re 8 we have plotted savings for life insurance against the rate 
of interest. 
i 
--------
ill ------_j 
f 
S(i) 
(Yo= Y) 
Figure 8 
. s. 
As the shape of the curve indicates, we have relative inelasticity 
at both ends of the schedule and almost complete inelasticity within 
the relevant range iul and 111• The subscripts ul and 11 denote the 
I ':r·· 
!I '.~· .. 
upper and the lower limits of the movements of the rate of interest 
within a 1normal 1 business cycle. 
We have interchanged the axes such that the independent variable is 
shown by the ordinate and the dependent variable by the abscissa. 
If we assume that the level of Y can be adjusted statistically 
to the various phases of a business cycle, we discover that the 
influence of the rate of interest on life insurance savings is 
negligible. 
As far as the limits are concerned, we may assume that there is a 
small group among the insured, whom \'le can call :the speculative 
group, which increases savings for life insurance purposes at low 
rates of interest. At such rates, the liquidity preference of the 
savers within the group has increased to such an extent that they 
decide to sell their holdings of securities in order to increase 
their cash balances. Rather than hold cash, we could assume that 
more life insurance is purchased which, as we stated, is a form 
of investment. A more intense precautionary motive may also be 
important.! Conversely, \-then the rate of interest rises to very 
high levels, the speculative group may freeze2 life insurance and 
employ the funds l'thich otherwise \'Tould be paid to the insurance 
companies in premiums, in more profitable investments. 
In addition, the group members may borrow from the companies 
using their policies as collateral. 
1 Item ;, page 24. 2 To freeze life insurance means to let the policy lapse and 
revive it again '·ri thin a certain prescribed period,. 
. . ' ~ 
The t'I'IO limiting cases' although theoretically possible; are 
not likely to occUl".in practice b~cause we ascribe to ·investors 
a degr'ee of rationality tlhich in reaiity does not exist. Hotrrever, 
these limits are not less 'realistic' than those of the Keynesian 
theory) 
The great majority of savers will be tri;i.thin the range ul,ll. 
·. * 
Keyne~, in the Gen~ral:T~eo~y 2 assumed that money which is used 
for transactions is a f~ction of economic activity. 
•, 
Later writers changed his:function somewhat to include the 
rate of interest:3, nruiiei;y 
S : S(i, Y) ( 10 ) 
or in particular for. any s1, .such as savings for life insurance 
( 11 .) 
Figure 8 shows that we riJB,y omit the rate of interest as an· 
important independent variable. Thi.s changes our function to 
. Si = G(Y). 
For one individual we have 
1 . . . 
2 Chapter,l, pp. 4-5. 
'S • ; J 
. 4 
= a(Y) 
(12 ) 
General Theory, ibid.:; pp. 169 - 174. ~ Hicks, J.R .• , 1Mr. Keynes and the Classics' Econometrica 1937. 
Chapter ;;, page 22, Equation (7). . 
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· and for the. \ihole economY' 
Si : A(Y). 
Because total savings equal total receipts by life' insurance 
companies 'l:fe have the · idendi ty 
or the equation 
s. 5 'R1 l.. 
Ri = A(Y). 
( 14 ) 
( 15 ) 
( 16 ) 
~le may· exp~d equation (16) and introduce a structural parameter 
so that 
Ri : A(Y) ·. + sz{(E), . ( 17 ) 
where sz{(E) depends on changes in attitudes of' the public toward 
security. 
Equation (17) is our final function which establishes that the 
premium receipts of life insurance companies depend on income 
and on the general 1psychologicalt and sociological propensity 
for security. 
• 'ile established in our analysis that the rate of interest is 
irrelevant to th.edetermination of'·the level of savings for 
life insurance investments. 
. ·Chapter 4 
. Life Insurance Theory (Continued ) 
To discover whether the Keynesian or the Loanable Funds Theory 
is applicable in the determinationof the rate of interest when 
we introduce institutions, is the main objective of this chapter • 
. Ve shall prove that we obtain a prope~ interest determination by 
using the Loanable Funds Theory whereas the Keynesian analysis 
· results in an indeterminate solution. 
~ie · start with· Ke~esi~ theory and assume that the supply of 
money which is regulated by the monetary authoriti·es is :fixed 
. . . 
over the time interval under examination. This.is not so 
Unrealistic as it may. sound b.ecause we can choose the time 
interval as small as we please. 
As mentioned before, money is demanded for two purposes, 
M1 and M2, where the symbol M1 stands :f'or the transaction and 
precautionary motives and M;i for the speculative motive.l 
Customarily, the :f'upction~:J 
M1 = lc(Y) and 
M2 = f(i) 
( 1 ) 
( 2 ) 
have been shown graphically such as in Figures 9;,;.A and 9""'B• 
The curve in Figure 9-A is made up of two parts: a sectiori 
1 . 
Keynes, General Theory, p. 170. 
Ll L2 
(Yl) (Y2) 
9-A 
-M i 
Figure 9 
. . 
k = M 
y 
which has inf'init~ slope ;..,; represented by L1 - and a section vthich 
slopes dol'm to the right - L2• 
\'/hen more money is needed £or transac~ion purposes· we shift from 
. . 
Contrary to Keynes who held tnat 
·', . ' 
1 
. L2 ;: . :f'(i) 
we know that it is in the f'orm 
L2 : ·_.·g(i, Y) 
o:f' \thich fact. we to~k accoUnt in 9-A by writing L1(Y1) •. 
1 Kurihara, ibid.,· :p. 67. · · 
·· Suppos.e we assume that Figur.es . 9-A and 9-B are not the 
. . 
schedules. ~or an individual but ·:ror an institution. How·. would 
this change affect the slope o~ the curves? 
- . . 
The shape o~ the curve. in Figure 9-B.is based on transa9tions 
and the stock of' money as welfas the. level o~ income. 
·Such factors are usually given .to a.ny .particular ind~try and 
the curve would retain its. particular position and slope. 
The curve in Figure 9-A; on the_ other band, is based on.the 
speculative motive and in that case >-Te have to make .. a considerable 
adjustment in theelas-t,ic portion of' L2 bece.~e it.se~ms to 
be established t}lat li~e insurance comp~es do not engage in 
~pecule.tions. 1 . 
There are several reasons for this; 
. '· : : . 
. . ' ·. ' 
(l) Li~e insurance companies have niairily e. long-range outlook.· 
(2) Contract~! obligations have to. be met in the life insurance 
business. l'lhen the. expectations of individuals ch~e, they 
. . 
can obtain money to satisf'y their liquidity preferences 
by selling. securities,. In depressions, the loss t:o individuals 
for holding cash is small .compared to the alternative which 
we assume is the inter. est pa.yments on bonds. 
Life insurance companies, on ~he other hand, have to pay 
large amounts in benefits. which come due regardless of' 
- ·. . . . . 
business conditions. We may expect that. even at a low rate of 
interestl when liquidity preference iS generally strong, 
.:· . .. ' 
the demand for cash by life insurance companies w.ill 
not change much. Companies may try to readjust the~f portfolios 
by investing nel-l savings and redeemed fUnds in short-term 
bills and notes but this is not.the same as holding cash. 
There will be. some demand f(;}r mo:re cash because applications 
for policy loans increa.se in depressions.l However, .the ratio 
of policy loans outstanding to total.assets held has always 
been rather small • 
(,~) As administrators of huge public fundsj life insurance companies 
have been subject to rather strict supervision by authorities. 
From these observations we c!an deduce. the folloi·ting: . 
:. 
"),. 
(l) Life insurance companies offer .a.ll.o:f their funds to the market 
and keep only small a,mounts of.cashas~eserves. · 
(2) The offer of. loanable funds to the market - in relation to 
a choice between cash and securities ~.is relatively interest 
inelastic •.. 
(.~) Because life insurance companies stand in a :f'iducitu"y 
.. relationship to ,their policyholders' they are forced to employ 
all funds in eEi.ch phase of a business cycle. 2. 
Let us examine the implications of' _the above statements in-relation 
to.the·determination of the rate of interest under Keynesian 
premisses. 
· \le stated that in the Keynesian theory ~he rate of' interest is 
~-_The Equitable, ibid., chapter 7. 
· OfLeary, ibid. 
I. 
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determined by the intersection of' the schedule of' the supply 
of' money and the schedule based on liquidity preference always 
taking into account that Keynes assumed that the marginal efficiency 
of investment is a function of the mentioned schedules and not 
conversely.1 
Using the mentioned two schedules we can differentiate three 
~ases. 
Case 1 - the supply of money is inelastic. 
Because there is no speculative element in the life insurance 
business, the demand curve for money is interest inelastic. 
This situation is shown in Fi~ure 10. 
i Sm 
k = M. y 
1 
. Dillard, ibid;,, PP• 167 - 179. 
• •• m 
Figure 10 
: ·, ' ' 
In the diagram iie have two c:Urves - the supply curve of' money, 
and the demand curve for money~ which are il1.terest inelastic 
- . ' - . . 
and only f\lnctions .Qf the ~orrespondi'ng -,Ieyel' of' income. 
It is obvious that 1-re have no solution. becauSe we need an 
intersection of the ·t,io curves in: order to obtain a certain 
rate of interest. .~ ·,. 
It -can be argued that it is not life insurance companies ~'lho 
. - . . . . 
desire to become liqUid in d~pressiqhs but t~e· policyholders. 
Ho'l'tever, such reasoning does not t'~ke into account the contractual 
:t}ature o~ life insurance contracts. Individuals,.· who haye claims 
on the existing stocks:ofmoney, give up part of.their claims to 
life insurance companies i'lhose liquidity preference is interest 
inelastic. If' \'le .assume, as has been poil,it.ed out, that individuals 
d,o not negotiate policy loans merely to satisfy· their liquidity 
preference- on account of the negative .rate of interest:- the 
shape of' the demand schedule in Figure 10 is justified. 
Case 2 - the supply of money is elastic., 
In case 1 .l-ie assumed that the supply of money is interest ineiastic 
' . 
because 'l-Ie a:rg'qed ·.that the time interval could be chosen· as small 
as we desired., Hoitever,. when we base our analysis· on a.. longer 
time peri<:>d we may assume.that the supply of money is elastic. 
For example, it has been repor.ted tluit the banking system 
·expanded its loans by ~~9 billion dollars or 10.:;% ih 19~5, 
in the face of a.·credit.policy.whichresulted.in a reduction 
of 600 million dollars of member. bank reserves and 2.3 billion . 
;a 
i 
Figure 11 
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dollar~ ,ip the money s~pply. 1 In other words, i~ we assume that 
the. rate. o~ ~terest .. is an indication of busi~ss expansion and 
aontraotion,. we may expect 'j:.hatthe existir;lg..stock o~ money will 
be turned over at a ~aster rate at.a high~r level o~ i~terest 
and at a slower rate at a lower.level. 
As ~igure 11 shows, we obtain ~ intersection o~ the schedules 
under such conditiqns. However, the rate o~ interest which is 
deter~d j,s ~tatic and remains at one .level, a. Suppose that we 
are in the expansionary phase o£ a b.usine~s cycle and that the 
banking system ~inances a higher income by increasing the velocity 
of money. This corresponds to a movement ~rom a to b in Figure 11. 
1 Smith, W., •on the E~~ectiveness o~ Monetary Policy', AER, 1956. 
However, a higher income corresponds to a movement of the Sm 
schedule to the right, which is analysed in the next case, and 
not along the curve. To go from a to b means that for any given 
level of income more money will be supplied at higher interest rates 
than at lower rates. Therefore, even if we have a high rate of 
interest which results in a faster money turnover, we still remain 
at the intersection position, a, because the demand schedule, which 
depends on the level of income, does not shift. 
The result is a static interest rate which is meaningless. 
Case ~ - the supply of money is elastic and changes for various 
levels of income. 
In this case the monetary authorities change the supply of money. 
This also can be regarded as an adjustment to changing levels 
of economic activities. 
Under such conditions, however, the demand schedules ~~ ~1 , 
give nevr points of intersections and, because the variable Y 
· is the same in the supply as well as in the demand schedules, 
these new points are at about the same level of the rate of interest 
as the original intersection a. 
Again, tve get a rather static interest determination which not 
only contradicts actual interest rate fluctuations, but is also 
of little use in any theoretical analysis. 
In summary, we have to conclude that it is not possible to 
derive a meaningful concept of interest rate determination 
·Figure 12 
·. under Keynesian. premiss~s \'lhen we employ part:i,al equilibrium 
analysis and assume thatthe liquidity preference parameters 
of all spending units are constant except those of life 
·insurance oompaniese 
* 
' Next,. let us look at the loanable funds theory. 
In this theory, liquidity preference is only one.of' several 
determinants of interest rate determination. For example, we may· 
I I 
S}t 
state the idendity 
I+H- - S+M ( ; ) 
and give to Ht the propensity to hoard, a value of zer~ such 'that 
-Lim F{I+H) 
H.,.O 
and still have a meaningfUl solution. 
·._ ( 4 ) 
To make the limit (4) clear, Figure5 of chapter 2 is reproduced 
_below. 
i 
io 
F 
Figure 1;· 
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. As ~ention~d before,, the demand for loanable funds consists 
.. of hoarding and investment. lf tire assume that- the demand f'or 
hoarding is zero, the schedule H becomes inelastic ~d.-parallel 
to the ordinate. Hot'lever, there is the I .schedule t-rhicl1 gives 
an intersection \V'i th 'the supply curve. 
_In the liquidity preference theo:r:-y,_lifeinsurance companies 
were not directly included in the determination of the rate of 
interest because of_the absence of·any ~pec:~ati~~ demand for . 
. money. Even ·if the hba:rdings s~hedule ·is zero, life insurance 
~ ' . ' . 
. -
.· companies are ,inciuded in, the loanable .f'unda theory beca.use. 
they supply the portion of aggregate savings to the market 
lvhich underlies the relatively inelastic· savings .schedule of 
Figure 1~.-
Life insurance companies may al.so influence the shape and 
· position of the n;oney schedule by selling securities, f'or 
·example, Government bonds; despite capital losses at ahigh 
- . 
rate of interest if they think that the high level of' interest 
rates will persist.1 
iJe may establish that in the loanable funds theory life 
insurance companies participate directly' in the. determination of 
. the rate of. interest~- · 
1 O'Leary, ibid. 
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Chapter 5 
Interest Rate Changes and Portfolio Adjustments 
In chapter 5 we shall examine hol-T life insurance companies react 
to changes in the short-, and long-term rates of interest and 
how such changes influence the portfolio composition of the 
companies. The conclusions to be drawn from the analysis which 
follo'I'IS are: 
(1) there is a small degree of short-term interest rate elasticity; 
(2) there is a considerable time lag before portfolios are 
adjusted to changed market conditions. 
* 
Up to now, we regarded interest rates as one rate ruling in a 
market. This is a convenient device that facilitates analysis 
considerably. In reality, there is, of course, a multitude of 
rates at any moment of time which guide the actions of the business 
community. For our purposes, a 'standard' rate is quite sufficient 
but we need to differentiate between the short-, and the long-
term interest rates. 
It is well kno\~ that for any given change in the rate of interest, 
the prices of long-term securities fluctuate more widely than those 
of short-term paper. The explanation lies in the fact that a 
distant future is quite uncertain, and the result of such uncertainty 
is a lower present value of long-term securities. 
Conversely, for anequa.l decline in the prices for long-term 
and short-term securities, the interest rate ·fluctuates more 
on short.;..te.rm bills than on long-term bonds. 
This situation is shown.in Figure 14. 1 
i 
i 0 , _ ___._~ -----
i 1 
PsP! P1 P{ 
Figure 14 
' 11.hen the rate of' interest falls from i 0 to 11, the price of short-
term bills rises :f'rom P8 to P!, while the price o~ long-term bonds 
I ·. 
increases from P1 to P1, which, as the diagram shows, is a 
substantially higher jump than the short-term price increase. 
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1 The diagram ha.s been taken from E.S. Shaw 1 s .1!,1oneyll Inc~me and 
Monetary Policy',- Irwin Series in Economics, Chicago, 1950, p. 312. 
Conversely, when we move in the opposite direction, from i1 to 
i 0 , short-term prices fall less than long-term quotations. 
It follows that interest rates are more stable in the long 
run than in the short run. When we translate this statement into 
the principle of interest rate determination, we can say that 
a like change in the supply and demand for loanable funds 
has different effects on short- and long-term rates. 
The reason for the relative instability of' the short-term rates 
is that commercial banks are often forced, on very short 
notice, to switch from a pro-borrowing to a pro-lending, 
position.1 
The divergence bet\'leen the short-, and long-term rates is of' 
importance to the speculator who, by acting on this divergence, 
assists in eliminating it. 
We may use an indifference curve approach to show the behavior 
of' a speculator such as in F~gure 15. 
In this diagram, the purchases of long-term securities are 
measured along the abscissa; those of short-term securities 
along the ordinate Y. The various indifference curves, ! 0 , 
I1, •••• In, show the increase in the absolute levels of 
satisfaction which is due to the increasingly larger amounts 
of securities owned. 
The 450 line has been used to show that, at points of' intersections 
with indifference curves, the speculator is indifferent to whether 
1 Shaw, ibid., pp. )12, )16. 
..... .-----, -------- ---~- "l 
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· ... Figure ).5 
he holds short-, or long-term securities. In other words, the 45° 
line traces the loci when a 'normal' rate of interest prevails which 
rules out uncertainty. At the normal rate,. the speculator may hold 
either short~term secur~ties, x~, or only long-term bonds, y:,, or · 
a. combination of both, X 0 y0 • 
trlhen we introduce uncertainty, we will diverge ·:rrom the norma). 
· rate or interest and, therefore, the speculator is going to 
change the composition or his portfolio. 
/ 
-If' the rate of' interest goes up, the slope of the norm.al - a 
normal is a line lthich is perpendicular to another line. (here . 
. . 
the 45° bisection) .- becomes increasingly st~epe~. This means 
that the speculator seUs shor:t-term paper and b-u;rs _long-term 
bondt:S., Conversely, when- the rate falls, he will sell long-term 
bonds to take advantage of capital gains. 
Bond prices fall when the rate of interest· goes up. As the · 
speculator buys long~term securities, he will, through his 
action, lower the rat.e 6f interest and rai~e the- price's of 
bonds •. T}le interest line, which. assuined a s.teep Slope \11th the 
rise, will becomel!iore·~lastic as th~ rate of' interest·f'alls 
a:nd approach its original positi-on in an oscillatory fashion. 
·This means that we have;an internal mechanism.which tends to 
adjust the- rate of' interest to~ what we III.ight call, moving. 
equilibrium. 
The behavior which we Mve_ascribed to speculators corresponds 
. . . 
·approximately to actual practice as described, for example, 
_by Keynes in the General Theory,.l -• · 
illien we leave specul,ators and examine the behavior of' H;f'e 
' ' . . 
insurance companie~;J, we discov~r considerable _inelast_i~ity of' 
reaction.; This is due to the f'ac_t .that lif'e insurailce companies 
are primarily interested in the long-~erni.rate of interest,.2 
This ·situation is shown.in.Figure 16 \1hich is similar: to 
Figure V? 'id th 'the excepti~n that the indifference curves are 
l Keynes, ibid., chapter 12 2 O'Leary, article, ibid,. 
. .,. .~···-
J 
x x2x 0 0 
steeper in slope. 
Figure 16 
When the rate of interest goes up, long-term securities will be 
bought but, as Figure 16 shows, in smaller quantities than in the 
preceding case. In other words, a change in the rate of interest 
does not cause a substantial portfolio readjustment. 
Therefore, we may conclude that life insurance companies 
contribute to the stability of the capital and money markets. 
The indifference curve analysis may also be used to show 
portfolio adjustments between several types of securities. 
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Figure 17 
. In Figure 17 we show a portfolio ~rhich consists of' bonds, measured 
along the abscissa, and stocks, measured along the Y ordinate. 
t'lhen the rate of' interest goes up, there is a tendency to dispose 
of bonds which have a relative low rate of' interest and offer the 
released funds to the market at the prevailing higher interest 
, rate. Under the ass'umption that the .higher interest rate. is 
expected to last f'ot-·a long· period of time, -:the life insurance 
company would sell x0x1of' bonds and buyy0 y1 of stocks (the 
X andY scales are different). 
The company will stop selling bonds at x1 and buying stocks at 
y1 because the indifference curve, I 8 , has a sharp break at this 
point. The reason f'or the particular shape of' the Is curve 
is that lif'e insurance companies are limited, by legislation, 
in their purchases of' common stock. 
This legislation was enacted for the security of' policyholders • 
. However, the New York Insuranc.e Law, \1hich has been the 
1 standard legislation1 , was amended in 1951 and in 1957 to 
permit life insurance companies to carry a higher percentage 
of' common.stock in their portfolios. 
Such a change o·f' attitude may be due to the fact that lif'e 
insurance companies invest only in high-quality stocks of 
companies which have shown stable earnings and dividend payments 
in the past. 
Finally, let us exami.ne'a portfolio which consists of' mortgages, 
industrial bonds, and Government bonds. 
Figure 18 has been devised to shot-r the relationship 'betl'reen 
the rate of interest, income, Government bonds, mortgages, and 
industrial bonds. 
The interest circle, i 0 , shows a given relationship between the 
several variables. When. the rate of interest goes up, the circle 
changes to an ellipse having the form 
1111 1 
t'lhere a) b )0. As the interest rate changes, the slope of the 
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Figure 18 
Income 
y 
Ind •. Bonds 
.Mortgages· 
z 
ellipse becomes steeper in relation to the x-axis and flatter 
in relation to the z- and y-axes. 
An increase in the rate of interest 1r1ill cause a change in the 
portfolio composition resulting in the disposal of' Government 
securities - fromxo to xl ~and in purchases of' mortgage-and 
industrial bonds. Hcn·rever, the adjustment process may take a 
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considerable period of time.1 
~fuen the rate of interest falls, ~the interes:t circie, i 0 , becomes 
an ellipse in an ea~t-west direction. This means that more Government 
bonds are -acqui:red_relative to.other securities. 
Such behavior can be explained by assuming that many companies 
are unwilling to buy industriS:l- and mortgage_ bonds at very high 
prices bu:t. rather inv~'st in a. ·secure and marketable· paper until 
the rate of interest has risen aga.in.2 . 
This concludes.oUl" exposition of the effects of changes in the 
.rate of interest on the composition of portfolios. 
1 
2 0
1Leary article, ibid. 
Keynes, General Theory, ibid., p. 169. 
Chapter 6 
The Supply ~f Loanable Funds 
A loiodel 
In this chapter we shall set up a sequence model to show how 
the supply of loanable funds was affected for the period 1950 
to 1959 as business conditions changed • 
. The contention is that the supply of loanable funds by life insurance 
companies was not much af~ected by changes in interest rates 
during the period under examination,, 
* 
Since 1950, we have had two business recessions, 1954 and 1958. 
Both recessions \'lere not severe and we may say that we had rather 
continuous growth in all sectors of the economy since 1950. 
Perhaps it would be more interesting to subject a model to 
sharper fluctuations truin have occured .in the last two recessions. 
However, it is not likely that we will experience again a depression 
similar to that of the ·thirties. Therefore, the last 10 years 
are adequate for <:>ur purpose. 
The model in this chapter is quite simple. We wish to show how 
net receipts - total receipts less expenses - change when the 
values of certain parameters are changed. The parametric values 
have been derived from statistics e.nd adjusted to our model. 
1 . Life Insurance Fact Bo<:>ks, 1950 to 1959; Spectator Year Books. 
There is an expectationai parwmeter whose value has been 
estimated between certain stated limits • 
• 
Let us first examine those items which make up the receipts 
of life insurance companies. 
Premium receipts. 
We shall assume that the level of premium payments is a function 
of income such that 
( 1 ) 
where a is the consumption coefficient for life insurance pUrchases, 
r a coefficient of expectations for the previous time period, and 
r 8 is the expectational ·coefficient for the present time period. 
It appears that the consumption coefficient (a) has a value of about 
~05 of personal disposable income. In our model, however, \'le doubled 
this parametric value to .1 in order to obtain larger amounts and 
therefore larger changes• 
Equation (1) says that the premium receipts of the present period 
depend on the level of income two time periods before, on the 
changes of income dl,U'ing the last three:time periods, and on the 
value of the.expectational·parameters. 
The amounts of life insurance purchased depend on expectations 
that rule in the pres~nt period, r 8 •· 
We shall assume that if the value of the coefficient of expectations 
is zero, individuals expect only temporary changes. :·lhen the 
coefficient is one, a.given r~te of change is assumed to continue. 
The expression a(Yt_2) is arbitrary and could also have. been 
expressed in tpe form of 
pt = ra(7(t ;.. Yt-1) + ra(Yt-1 . -. yt-2) + 
ra(Yt-2 · - Yt-~)+ • • • • • +ra( Yt-n+l - 1t-n> • 
However, a simple level expression a(Yt-2) is easier to handle 
than a series of difference equations. 
Investment receipts. 
The investment income of life insui·ance companies depends on 
the amount of assets held at the beginning of the time period, 
minus sales of assets in the present period, minus redeemed 
securities of the present period • 
. Therefore, 
( 2 ) 
\-lhere Et is investment income in the .present period, Kt-l 
the investment stock of theprevious period, SK and RK sales 
and redemptions ofsecurities. 
To be accurate \te should add into equation (2) the purchases 
of securities in the present time period. Hot'leVer, i'le assume the 
presence of certain time- and reaction lags in the.portfolio 
adjustment processes., 
i is the long-terra interest rate which, traditionally, tvas held 
to be about ~%. 
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Sales and redemption receipts. 
When we computed the return on investments, we subtracted the 
sales and redemption receipts from the previous stock of investments. 
However, the amounts from sales and redemptions have to be added 
back to the total receipts of life insurance companies, in order 
to arrive at the amount that can be used for new investments. 
We assume that life insurance companies act prudently and 
consider sales of securities only when the long-term rate of 
interest changes. 
In other words, sales are a function of the rate of interest 
such that 
SK : F(i) 
which leads to the more exact formulation 
6 Kt-1 -2 a 
(1 + i) 
( ; ) 
• 
( 4 ) 
In equation (4) we assume that for any given change in the rate 
of interest there is always only a portion of the total 
amount of securities which life insurance companies \'lould 
consider for sale. This portion,AKt_1, is divided by the 
rate of interest times an exponential parameter, a-2 or ~' 
a 
which is based on the fact that long-term securities, which 
make up the major part of life insurance portfolios, are 
subject to larger fluctuations in prices, for any given change 
in the rate of interest, than short-term securities. 
Although a fUnctional statement such as equation (;) appears 
to be correct, it seems that in the.case of' life insurance 
.companies sales of·securities are relativelyinterest 
ine1astic.l Commonly, s~curities are held until maturity 
and then channelled intomore profitable investments. 
Therefore, we shall assume .in the model that SK is 
.a constant which changes only ·in relation to total assets. 
. . 
Total life insu~ance receipts are also increased by 
security redemptions • Again \-te. assume that the amount 
of' redeemed funds is ~ relative constant proportion of' 
. total assets. 
Four items' then, make up the total. supply of funds and we 
can establish the relationship 
.. Before we· can arrive at the .amou:ht which is ·available for 
new investments, we have to consi.der a number of' deductions. 
Benefit p~ents. 
i'le shall assume that benefit pa.yments are ~enerally a percenta.ge 
of present income ... i:t,1come is assumed to consist of premium 
receipts and investment returns,.. which we ta.ke to be 50% or' 
_l,. 
2• 
·Therefore, 
Bp : b(I), ( 6 l 
"1 O'Leary, article, ibid. 
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where Bp are benefit payments, b. the percentage coefficient, and 
I the mentioned income. 
Next ,.,e should consider general administrative expenses, selling 
.· . 
expenses, taxes, divide~ds,. retained earriings, all or \'lhich have 
to be deducted from total receipts. ·.Again •·re can asswne that 
these items are · a certain . proportion. of income and \te write 
.. 
. G = c(I), ( 7 ) 
trhere G is the total of' the above mentioned payments and 
deductions, and c the perce~tage coefficient which is assumed 
to be 20% or 1/5. · .. 
By adding up equations (6) and (7) we can simplify so that 
B '+ G ::: h( I) , . p ( 8 ) 
·l'rhere h :·b+c. 
Cash retained for policy loans. 
· ~1e may assume that cash retained f'or policy loans is a function 
of income and the rate of interest, such that when the rate 
of' interest goes down • which is assumed.to be an indication 
of declining business activity- the.a.mount of' cash retained goes 
· up• This results in a hyperbolic equation of' the form 
H : y(I) 
(l+ :i) ' 
( 9 ) 
vrhere H stands for cash retentions, y for the percentage coef'f'icient 
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which is assumed to be 2j% or l/4o, and i the short-term rate o~ 
interest. 
\llhen i) I, the amount of policy loans will decline; when i ( i, loans 
will increase. 
Finally, we shall make a deduction for funds which are held in 
the form of near-money, such as Treasury certificates, bills, 
notes, etc •• To keep the equation simple, we shall assume that 
funds \'thich are retained to be invested in short-term securities, 
depend on I and 1, which results in another hyperbolic equation 
J = x(I) 
' 
( 10 ) 
(1 + i~) 
where J is the amount retained, x a coefficient t-thich l'le assume 
to be abo~t 1/5, and i 0 the long-term rate o~ interest. 
Equation (10) says that when the rate of interest goes down, 
the funds which are retained to be invested in bills, notes, 
and certi~icates, become larger. We have squared the rate of 
interest to indicate that a sharp decline in business activity 
increases the funds which are to be kept in short-term paper 
in quadratic proportions. 
By introducing an equation such as (10), we have allowed a 
certain element of speculation in our model and we shall see 
that changes in the rate of interest affect the supply of 
loanable funds only to a small degree through equation (10). 
Having stated the basic components of the model, we may begin 
to put.our equations together. 
Therefore, 
= aYt-2+ raYt_1 - raYt_2 + 
rsaYt 
- rsaYt~l + I(Kt-1 ... 
SK- RK) + SK + .RK 
-
aYt_2(1 - ·r) + aYt_1(r - rs) 
-
. . 
Equation (11) represents the total receipts of life insUrance 
companies. 
Next, we have deductions such that 
-
·- .·· 
hi + yi +- xi • ( 12 ) 
. (1 +-i) (1'+ i~). 
If' we substitute Pt + Et = I, w.e obtain the idendity 
( 1; ) . 
'l'thich can be simplified to 
I + Sl(+ RK - · I(h ..._-2-- + x . ) . = Sf, ( 14 ) 
. '· ,(l+i) (l+i~) 
where Sr is the supply o~ loanable ~unds to the market • 
... 
In several symbols, the time subscript (*)t has been dropped 
to facilitate easier reading of the equations. 
We can expand equation (14) to 
. I(l 
- h - y - x . ) + SK + RK : Sf 
(l+i) (lti*) 
which, by substitution results in the final form 
i(Kt-l - SK . - Rx)J (l - h - ......z_ 
(1 + i) 
= 
' 
However, we can simplify equation (16) by substituting the 
letter A for the first term with brackets, the letter B for 
the second term within parentheses, and obtain 
= 
If r = 1, the first term in equation (16) drops out; 
if' r = rs = 1, then the first two terms drop out. 
We shall assume that in periods of expansion the coefficient 
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( 15 ) 
( 16 ) 
( 17 ) 
of' expectations has the value 1. In a recession, this coefficient 
is assumed to decline to a value of .2. ·· 
Both values are arbitrary and indicate that in an expansionary 
period, businessmen expect that the present prosperity will 
continue while a slight business contraction will affect 
future expectations considerably and reduce the coefficient to 
a value of .2. 
To ~hoi'l how our equations work \-Then applied to the period 1950 to 
1959, tie have computed in Table 4 the. supply of' loanable 
~unds to the market. 
In column (1) o~ the Table, ~re gave GNP in constant 1954 dollars. 
Columns (2) and (;) show changes in interest rates. 
In ( 4) and (5) t·ze :!lave g;ven the. values for the coe~~icients 
·of expectations •. The values in columns (6), (7), (8), and (9), 
have been computed from equation (16) ·and taken ~roni the available 
li~e .insurance statistics. 
·column (10) shovrs the supply of loanable funds according to 
equation (16). 
The actual figures for the period are showr1 incolumn:(ll) 
_and range ~rom 1,?. 7 to 18.2 billion dollars •. \'lith the: exception 
. . 
of 1951, we have a_ continuous increase in the yearly supply of 
loanable ~unds to the market. Our model is more stable because 
in reality we probably have larger lags than we assumed in t-he· 
· model. 
From the figures in Table 4 we can draw the follol'ling conclusionss 
(l) the relative constant.growth of GNP for the_period 1950 to 
1959 was mainly responsible for_ the relative constant 
supply of loanable funds 'to the market; 
(2) the influence o~ changes in interest rates on the supply of 
loanable funds wa.s<negligible; 
(;) the items SI( and RK, growing with total assets, 
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6; 
· accounted mainly for. changes in the supply o'f loanable 
funds; 
(4) the flow of'premium receipts was relatively constant 
and depended on lagg~d income and on the parameter 
of' expectations •.. · 
··This concludes our analysis· o'f. a theoretical flow ... of' .... f'unds. 
model. 
TABLE 4 
Year·~ . GNP 54 i i ·. 1" r A B . S ·. R S st (1) (2) . (;~ (4). (5f (6} (7) (8)K(9)~ (1g) (11 
.1950 ;2o ;%·· ;% 1.0 1.0 ;,? .. 8 .0760 . ; 1 12.6 1,5 .. 7 
1951 ;4o 2_;/4:? . 1~0 . 1.0 ;6.o .0757 ; 7 12.7 19a 
1952 ?>55 ; ; 1,.0 1.0 ?>7 .6/.0760 ; 7" 12.9 15.0 
195; ;70 ;~ ,. l.d 1~0 ;9.1 ,.0758 4 7 14.0 15.1 
1954 . ;65 ; ; 1.o•• .• 2 ;9.1 .. 0760 4 7 14.0 14.0 
1955 390 ;~ ; i .2. 1.0 41.8 .0758 4 
' 
7 14.2 17.; 
1956 400 ; :l;' . 1 ,; ·;g;- 1.,0 1.() 42.4 .0758 .4 7 14.'2 18.1 
1957 410 ;~ 3 i l.O 1.0 4;.4 .0759 .5 8 16.; 17.9 
" 
1958. 4oo ; ;/4 ; ll.O .2 4;.; .0700 5 8 16.; 18.2 
1959 420 4 ; J, .2 1.0 45.4 .078J 5 .8 16.5 4 
Ohapter 7 
Government Securities 
It appears that life insurance companies, as a·group, increase their 
holdings of Government securities during war periods. 
Ohart 5 sho\'IS two prominent peaks for ~l.W.I and i'i.~'i.II, of which 
the latter dwarfs the former absolutely and relatively. 
The Korean Conflict stood in the shadow of W.W.II and did not change 
the downward trend. This may be due to the fact that the Government 
had not tapped the capital market to any great extent.1 
Both, Ohart ; and Table 5, show that the holdings of Government 
securities declined from an all-time peak of 45.9% of total 
life insurance assets in 1945 constantly until the present. 
The decline from 1945 to 1950.took place at an accelerated rate; 
and since 1950 at a decelerated rate. 
Despite the rapid decrease after W.W.II in Government security 
holdings, the 1950 year-end total still represented a sizeable 
chunk of life insurance investments amounting to 21% of the 
total assets of all life insurance assets. 
The figure of 21%, with the exception of the years 1942-1949, 
inclusive, topped every other year in history.2 We should not, 
however, assume, as life insurance companies would like 
to have us do ( Fact Books, Spectator Book), that the 
1 Annual Reports of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 1955. 
2 Life Insurance Fact Book 1959. 
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Table 5 
u.s. Government 3ecurities Oimeci by Life Insurance Companies. 
Year: In Current Dollar~: 'is Percentage 
of .Total Assets; 
"' 
1950 15.459 billion 21.0% 
1951 '11.009 16,;1 
1952 .· 10.252' 14~0 
1952 9.829 12.5 
1954 . ; . '9.070 10.7 
1955 8·576 9.5 
.1956 7.555 7.9 
1957 7.029 6.9 
1958 7;,.182 6.7 
1940 5.767 18.7 
1945 ·. 20.582 45.9 
Source: Life Insuraribe Fiuit Book, 1959~ 
increase in the holdings of' Government securities during war perioP,s, 
is the result of' patriotic sentiments only.1 Rather, we should 
assume that it is businesslike to buyGovernment securities 
during a war.· First, there is the strong moral pressure rthich the· 
' ' ' 
Government exerts on the economY as a whole to invest in Government 
. bonds. Secondly, there are considerably f'ewer investment opportunities 
l Lif'e Insurance Fact Book, 1959, p.67; O'Leary's Life Ins. Reports. 
for profitable long-term returns. Thirdly, institutions 
do not know how successful individual companies \'rill be 
in their post-v-ta.r conversion attel!).pts, Lastly; mortgage holdings, 
uhich are a. large per:centage o:P total assets of life insurance 
companies, decline because residential construction is slo\1ed 
do\m by the lack of raw materials. 
T~ere is, then, an element of uncertB.inty \'lhich makes· it advisable 
for life insurance companies to invest in securities t·thich are 
certain to be redeemed. 
Returning to the postwar period_, we noted that since 1946 there 
. . 
has been a steady decline in the holdings of Government securities 
by life insurance CQmpa.:riies. The life insUrance industry did not, 
hot-rever, discontinue purcha.s~ng· additional Government securities. 
.. .., . -
But the acquisitions of bills, certificates, and notes were.more 
than of'fset by sales and redemptions of bonds, so that the total 
. •. .. . 
holdings continued"to:decline. 
The foregoing remarks serveas abackgro:und to. our subsequent 
aha.ly.sis f'or the period. 1950 ·to 1958. 
Early in 1950, the Federal Reserve System _began selling long-terra 
Government bonds to absorb some'of' the long-term funds seeking 
investmertts,l_These funds Here supplied in part by life insurance 
companies,_ which invested in long-term bonds in lieu of' .better 
1 Annual Reports of the Governors, ibid.,1951. 
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opportuni.ties. About 2.5 bUlion dollars .of such bonds, which were 
not eligible for purchases by c;orm:ilercial banks, were sold during 
the first 8 months of 1950;. This ·action ttas reflected by a moderate 
change in. the rate of' i~terest} The·rates on short..;termGovernment 
securities, 'I'Thich' had begun to rise in late 1949, moved irregularly 
higher for severa.l:rnoriths •. The decline inyields on long-term 
securities, "thich had continued in the latter part of 1949, was 
arrested early iri 1950. Until' the .. end of 'the year; rates ori long-
term securities advanced only slightly. Short-term rates, hovrever, 
'increased even further and we:l·e, at the end of the year, ·at higher 
' ·:·, 
levels than at any time e~ince the e~rly thirtieif.?; 
The reactions of.life.i~suranoe companies to the above movements. 
in rates 't"tere noticeable. The companies stopped buying long-term 
bonds and began to buy short;..term paper instead~ Because restrictive 
acti.ons of 'the Federal Reserve System decreased the availability 
'of credit in the second half of 1950, life insurance companies 
began to channel fUnds, that l'lere released by sales and redemptions 
of. long-term Government bonds, to other. sectors of th's economy 
' ~ . 
. uhere higher yields .could be obtai~ed. Some Government bonds were 
· sold to the Federal Reserve Banks but the amounts ~·tere small. 
Summarizing we can sliy that life. insurance companies reacted 
t~ changed interest rates in 1950and·shifted: 1) from long-term 
bonds ·to short:-term bills, notes1 and certificates; 2) :f'rom 
Governm.erit securities to industrial bonds and residential mortgages. 
1 Annual Reports of' the Governors, ibid.., 1951. 
2 Spectator Year Book,· 195;; Life Insurance Fact Book, 1952. 
·~ ' ' 
The main event in 1951 was the Aeoord bet'\'l~e~ Treasury and 
' . ' 
the Federal Reserve 'fllhich. took place ,,in Match. The fir~t step.· 
und~r the Accord >'las the exohange of marketable U~ited: States 
. . . . 
.long,;.term bonds for new long-term bonds which \'lere ~ot directly 
mar-ketabl·e. The holders o.r: the tw·o lo:nge'!3t-term 2ii~ baruc.;.;.restricted 
·bonds. of 1967-72 'flrere of'f'eJ:"ed in e~change 2 5/4/a bonds 1975-801 
·convertible at the holders' _options into ~-~ 'five-year 
-1 
marketable notes. · 
Life insurance companies participate~ on. a •· l'arge scale in this 
exchange by turning in abou~ ; billion· dollars of. 2%%. b,onds. 2 
' . .. . . - . . 
·.This gave the companies m op·portUrP,ty to shif>t intq higher 
. . .. ' . t 
yi~lding securitiea.·In case the long•termrate of. ~riterest 
should continue. to increase, the companies . could ahtays turn 
the bonds in for the marketable note-s. · 
This exchange operati()n paved·. the \'lay for the. discontinuation 
of Federal Reserve purchases ofGovernmen~ bonds at fixed 
' ' ' 
prices. After June the Federal .Reserve bought practically 
. ·. . . ' 
no long-term bonds. The prices of' the 2~ restricted bonds, \thich 
_ had been sur> ported ar~und 100 5/4~ in January and February, 
·fluctuated around 9V~ during the latter half of the ·year 
· 'flrhen the market was on its o'l'tn. 
This situation contrasted sharply \'lith the conditions that had 
prevailed during the postwar period before March 1951., uhen life 
insurance companies could sell any amount. of bonds to the Federal 
1 . ' ' -.. ' ,, ·. ·.·· . . ' 
. Annual Report of the Governors, ibid.,, 1952. ~ 1951 Record of Life Insuranc.e Investments, Life Ins. association. 
Reserve System at relatively fixed prices. After April/r·!ay 1951, 
the companies undoubtly realized that prices would decline further 
if they forced more bonds on the market. For these reasons, the 
-life insurance companies sold only amall quantities of bonds 
· in order to avoid .capital losses. · 
Another important step under the Accord.was the change in policy 
regarding short-term Government_securities. Beginning in early 
March·l951, the_ shor.t-terin Government securities market was 
largely without Federal Reserve open market support. Any life 
ina'l.U'ance company,_wishing to dispose of' short-term paper, had 
.to depend on buyers in the market. As a result of this, Treasury 
bill rates fluctuated more widely than previously, but generally 
were sonie\'lhat beloti' the Federal Reserve discount rate~ 
The Accord was not as successful as anticipated. The Federal 
Reserve believed that once-the market forces werefreed, companies 
would be restrained from-selling securities because of the capital 
loss i·rhich they \'lould suffer. However, uhen prices fluctuate, 
. . . 
those on long-term bonds ·cha.nge more _than those on short-term 
paper.l Consequently, the firms which hold mainly short-term bills, 
. ·. . 
. . 
are not deterred much fro~ sell.ing in the market . when the interest 
rate rise~ .. The 1f:reez:ing.;;in 1 or 11ocking;_in1 effect does not 
l'IOrk well in the case of short-term bills. 2 Since life insurance 
companies had bought·m()atly short-term bills and certificates since 
the end o:f' 1'1.\·t.II, they still could draw .on substantial funds for 
1 Chapter 5, p. 44 
2 Smith; 10ri the Effectiveness of !vionetary Policy', AER, 1956. 
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·investing in securities bearing higher yields. Table 5 shows that 
the holdings of Government securitiesdeclined by 2.5 billion dollars 
during 1951. Uhile Government securities still made up 21% of total 
assets at the end of. 1950, this percentage figure had declined 
to 16,%'by the end of 1951. 
* 
Interest rates declined some\'lhat in the early months of 1952 but 
subsequent heavy demands for loanable funds caused the rates to 
rise. again. The changing sit~tion \'tas reflected in the Treasury 
bill rate as the most sensitive market rate. In the early part of 
the year the bill rate was generally ·.below the Federal Reserve 
discount rate of 1 3/4% but after· midy~ar the bill rat~ rose above 
the discount rate, and reached at year-end 2:1% • .Just as in 1951, 
the Treasury rat,.e apparently ,fluctuated fairly widely.il1 response 
to short-term changes in money market conditions. Long-term Treasury 
yields showed ~eclining tendencies until July and then stiffened 
· some\'lhat. 
Life insurance companies decreased:. their holdings. of Government 
securities by only .8 billion dolls.~~ l-ihich represented .a 2% 
relative decline-in:t~rms or' total assets. Ohe.rt 4 shows that 
. . 
. the Federal Reserve discount rate remained constant during 1952. 
The rates on corporate-,and ~ong-tel'm Government bonds likewise 
remained rather cons~ant throughout the year. 
' . Life insurance companies bought only few long-term Government 
bonds. Iiew savings, which WeJ:lt to lif'e in~urance companies in the 
form of' larger premium payments,.were invested in securities other 
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than long-term Governments. Although life insurance companies 
bought ;.6 billion dollars in Government securities, mainly 
short-term bills and certificates, during the first 9 months 
of 1952, sales and redemptions \'/ere la::cger than this figure, 
hence the decline. 
* 
In Januar,y 195;, the discount rate was raised to 1 ;/4.% which was 
designed to align the discount rate with the short-term market 
rates.1 Total demand in the first half of 195; \"las at nei'l higher 
levels. The resUlting pressure on credit resulted in a moderate 
increase in interest rates through mid-April and then in sharp 
advances. Most rates reached their highs in May and June when 
borrowing demands were heaviest. Beginni~ in June rates declined 
sharply, in some cases more sharply than they had previously 
risen. At the end of the year the market yield on bills was 
down to li%, substantially below the level a year earlier. 
Yields on other Government securities and on short-term private 
paper were below those prevailing at the beginning of the year. 
The statistics ~rhich are available seem to indicate a rather 
quick reaction by life insurance companies to changes in the 
Treasury bill rate. This may be due to the advantages of 
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short-term Government securities such as a high degree of liquidity, 
absolute safety, and a favorable return. 
1 Annual Report of the Board of Governors, ibid., 195;. 
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One of' the reasons that l-Ie have only· a small decline in 
Government security holdings during the year may have been . 
that the interest rate movements during 195' vtere not indicative 
.of any trend. 
* 
Broad recovery vras under way as the year 1954 closed follouing 
the period of moderate contraction uhich began in mid-year 1953. 
Throughout 1954, credit \·Tas readily available on terms attractive 
to borro\'lers and demand for many types of credit grew. During the 
first half of February 1954, the discount rate was reduced from 
2% to 1 '/4}~. A second reduction w~.s made later -from 1 '/4';~ to 1-~. 
Clearly, these actions were designed to ease credit.· 
Interest rates declined sharply in the early part of 1954, 
continuing the d.otmt'lard trend that began in mid:..1953. The decline 
reflected the large volume of'· fu.."'ldS available, as \'lell as some 
diminution in demand. The Treasury bill rate showed the sharpest 
decline during the first half of the year and the sharpest rise 
during the second half. At its low, .61%, .the rate was only 
one-fourth of the mid-195.5 high and the lowest since 1947.1 
The sharp advance in midsummer reflected in part a technical 
market reaction from the previous sharp drop and in part some 
tightening in the mo~ey 'centers.2 .Yields on Government bonds 
declined.· steadily to a level· of 2·~ and increased only slightly 
1 Chart 4, p. 72. •. 
. 2 Annual Report of' the Board.of Governors, 1954. 
until the e~d of the year. 
Life insurance companies held about .8 billion dollars less 
in Government bonds at the end of 1954 than at the close of 
195,. The total acquisitions of Government securities, however, 
were about 1.4 billion dollars higher in 1954 than in 1957, 
amounting to a total of $ 5., billion.l 
The primary reason for the decre~se in absolute holdings was 
that large amounts of bonds matured in 1954. 
Most purchases were made in short-term paper and turned over 
several times a year. 
Charts 4 and 5 show the movements of interest rates during the 
year. A correlation between the fluctuations of the short-term 
bill rate and the purchases of bills by the life insurance 
industry is apparent although very slight. The purchases of 
bills seem to have been bunched into the second half of 1954 
when the rates were higher than in the-first half.2 
while most of the ne\'1 savings that went to life insurance companies 
were invested in short-term bills, notes, and certificates, 
a large portion of funds, which was released by redemptions, 
found its way into private industry, the largest increase 
being in mortgage holdings which show·ed the most favorable 
investment conditions. It will be shown' that the slow but 
steady portfolio change from Government security holdings to 
industrial bonds and mortgages continued a movement which 
1 Spectator Yearbook, 1955· 
2 1954 Record of Life Insurance Investments, ibid., New York. 
3 Chapter 9. 
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began ·shortly after \1.t1:.II and. which re.I'lected the more favorable 
returns and conditions .in those industries. 
·* 
·• At the end of the year; most short-term. rates were at the 
highest levels,in more than 20 years,.2 
Theyields on long-term.sectirities were only slightly above 
the short-term rates at the ~nd of 1955 as is evident from 
Charts 4 and 5. 
Federal Reserve discountrates were advanced four times during 
. . . 
the year. The differential between yields on·Treasury bills 
and long-term u.s. Government bonds, de~lined from more 
than li% to le~s than i%, the smallest spread since 19,0.; 
1 . . . . . . . . . .·" 
2 Annual Report of the Board· of (}overnors,.ibid., 1955. :~t Life Insurance Fact Book, 1955. · 
"' Annual Report, ibid., 1955. - · 
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The holdings of Government securities by life insurance 
companies declined by .5 billion dollars during the year. 
The total acquisitions of Government securities were higher 
in 1955 than in 1954 ~ 6.6 billion dollars in comparison 
with 5.5 billi~n. 
The assets of life insurance companies increased by about 
6 billion dollars during the year as she~ in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Total Assets of Life Insurance Companies. 
1950 64,.020 billion dollars 
1951 68.278 
1952 7'5.575 
1955 78.555 
1954 84.486 
1955 90.4j2 
1956 96.011 
1957 101.509 
1958 107.580 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1959. 
The increase in assets 't'tas mainly due to the large amounts 
of nel't savings which t-rent to life insurance companies. 
As far as the composition of the total acquisitions is concerned, 
most purchases were in Treasury bills and certificates and only 
275 million dollars of ;J/o bonds were added:totheportfolio~. 
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The high rate on bills made long-term investments unattractive. 
Because the demand for funds by the Government increased 
condiderably all through the year, bill prices fell to lO'\•ter 
levels than ever.l 
Because the long ... term rate :remain~d. relatively constant during 
the year, the investment .. policy of'' life insurance. companies 
. ' 
· liki:ntise did not· chan~e · much..· 
\te may inquire at this point whether. t.he correlation beti'teen 
movements of' the rate of' interest and the investment policy 
of' life insurance, companies is really so simple_or uhether 
there are some other variables which should be taken into 
consideration, such as competition for high-quality securities, 
cost of acquisition and carrying securities, etc •• 
Although institutions-in general,.and life insurance companies 
in particular, have experienced phenomenal grovtth during .. the 
last 15 years resulting in heavy demand f'or high-grade securities, 
such demand has been met by an equally huge supply in the postuar 
period. Nearly 4oo billion dollars of primary securities 
have been issued during the-period 1947 to 1958. 
Table 7 shovts that the average ratio of prin:lary security issues 
to GNP was 9.6.%. 
There was no indication of any shortage of' high-quality securities 
at any time. For example, since the passage of the Public Utility 
Holding Act of 19j5, most securities of public utility companies 
have been sold by competitive bidding. Only occasionally, lif'e 
1 Annual Reports by _the Board of' Governors, ibid., 1955. 
\. 
'-
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'insurance companies will bid at these competitive sales, but:_to. 
date (195:7) this method of ~c9-ui:dng s~curities has .been of no 
significance in insuranc~ company operations.1 -
'l'able 7 
Net.Issues of Primary_Securities and Gross National Product 
Issues: _ _ GNP (current. prices) 
1950 --. :75•8 billion dollars 284.6 billion 
1951 . jl.8 )29.0 
1952 ;9.4 ;47.0 
1953 .;2.4 ;65.4 
1954 ;i.9_ . ;6;.1 
1955 - 52.9 "597~5 
1956 35.6 419.2 . 
l957 ;4.8 442.5 
1958 44.7 441.7 
·' .. Source: Income and Output~- De-:::>t;; of Commerce, 1959 .. 
There seems to be an indication that life insurance companies 
have been able to acquire an increasingvolume of'.investlnents 
through private placements.2 By negotiating directly l'lith 
. . . . . : 
borro\'lers, costs of' acquiring investments have been kept to 
a minimum.; In a.ddi tion, the cost of' supervision may be lo-vier 
1 Investments of' Life Insurance Funds, Univers~ of Pa,. Press, 1955, 
2 'Management of' Investment Portfolios·•, P• 67; Statement by R. 
:; ibid., p. 65.; · B. Patrick,_Finan~ial Vice-President, 
"' ibid., p. 66. BankeJ;"s Life Company. 
in the case of privately negotiated investments because the 
average size of an investment tends to be larger and the 
issued securities of somewhat better quality.l 
Judging by the information which is available, it appears 
that a correlation between changes of the rate of interest 
and changes in investment policies is adequate to explain 
life insurance portfolio adjustments.2 
* 
In 1956, economic activity continued to expand. 
With output near capacity in industries producing basic 
materials and aggregate demand ~or goods and services mounting, 
prices at wholesale and resale rose throughout the year. 
With overall demand ~or credit strong and the supply of loanable 
funds limited, interest rates continued to rise in 1956, 
reaching the highest levels since the early 19,0 1s.' 
Yields on long-term Treasury issues rose less than those on 
corporate and municipal bonds, while those on intermediate 
securities remained above long-ter.m Treasury yields during 
moat of the year. Treasury bill yields fluctuated with pressure 
on bank reserves but rose sharply in the second half o~ the year 
as pressures on credit increased. The movement o~ rates is shown 
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~ 'Mgmt. o~ Inv. Portfolios', ibid., p. 66. 
ibid., chapter 6, statement by D. Meredith, Exec. Vice-President 
of the National Life Ins. Co.; and chapter 7, A.R. La Force, 
~ Second Vice-President o~ the Metropolitan Life Ins. Company. 
~ Annual Report of the Board of Governors, ibid., 1956. 
in Charts ,4 and 5~ 
Government security'holdillgs by life insurance companies 
declined by about 1 billion dollar$ during the year. 
This t-1as the largest 'decline since. ·1951. ~ihile ·the holdings 
of' Government securities were 9~ of total assets at the end of · 
1955, the percentage had declined to 7.9/o· at the end of · 
1956, despite an increase in total assets of 6.billion .dollars • 
. The total acqui~itions of Government·securities were ~ 4.8 
billion, of tthich 85% \tere in short ... term bills and certif'icates.1 
* 
-Output, employment, consumption, and investment in fixed capital 
established new records in 1957. At. the year-end, hot'lever, 
economic activity was declining in the United States. 
The pressures of capital and credit demands ·On the supply of 
82 
new savings and other: loanable fl:Ulds - in the face of restrictive. 
--==-
monetary policies - led tci the, highest levelS of interest 
rates in more thant~o decades.2 Interest costs to the 
Government rose to. new high levels during the first three 
quarters of the year. By late sunimer the spread bet~teen 
short- and long-term Treasury securities had almost disappeared. 
In the last quarter of the year all rates declined sharply 
in response to the downturn in economic.activity and the 
relaxation of' credit restraints. 
1 
2 Record of Life Insurance Investments, 1956. Annual Report of the Board of Governors, ibid., 1956. 
Life insurance companies decr~ased their )loldings of 
Government' secUrities by .5 billion dollars in 1957 • 
This re1;1resented a percentage decline•~in relation ·to total 
assets of 1%. 
The-total acquisitions· of Government securities amounted 
to ;.6 billion dollars or .6 billion dollars less than in 
1956. The reason for the decline in purchases 't'tas that 
favorable investment opportunities absorbed large amounts 
of nei.., savings and released funds. 
Life insurance companies-continued to dispose_oflong-term 
Government bonds. Statistics sho\"7 that the companies 
bought more short-term Government securities in the 
•recession 1 quarter than in any other quarter ofthe year.l 
It appears that life insurance investment policies remained 
relatively unchanged during the year •• 
At the beginning of 1958, economic act~vity was receding. 
Contraction in output and employment 't'las general, and 
•• • J > 
unemployment was rising at a disturbing rate. No one was 
. quite sure how far the d-ownward adjustment \'rould go, or ho11 
long it would last, although business expect-ed an early 
upturn. 2 By the early part of the second quartel:", personal 
income and consumer spending. had ceased todecline arid, in 
1 
2 Record of'- Life Insurance Investments, 1957 • 
. .i.nnual Report of the Board of Governors, 1958. 
fact, were rising slightly. Production and employment turned 
upward soon after. 
From late fall of 1957 through April 1958, there l-Tere four 
reductions .in the Federal Reserve discount rate, from ;~~ 
to 1 ;/4%. In the late summer of 1958, the rate was raised 
again to 2~.· 
Market interest rates on U.S~ Government securities declined. 
filrther in the .early months of.l958, following the sharp 
drop t'lhich occured in the fall of 1957. Treasury bills and 
inter:mediate;.,ter:m issues fell muchm.ore than the rates on 
bonds. The smaller drop in long-term rates resulted in part. 
from the continuation of a substantial volum.e of bond issues 
by corporations and State and );ocal governments, as ttell · 
as by the Federal Government• a.s shown in Table 8. 
An increase of' 154 million dollars in the holdings of U.S. 
Government securities reversed an n .... year dcnv-m1ard trend in 
the B.!!lounts of these holdtngs. A to:t.al of 7 •2 billion dollars 
. . 
of Government securities ~tas owned by. the year-end 1958 
·compared 't'Tith 7· ·billion a,.t the end of 1957. The 1958 holdings 
were higher than :f'or any year prior to 1942 but were only 
one-third of' the peak ownership of' 21.6 billion dollars in 
1946.· 
The· total acquisitions of Government securities l'iere about 
' . - . 
5 billion dol1S,rf3. d~ring theyear:~ or about 1.4 billion dollars 
more than in 1957. A l9.rge. share i3f' these purchases, about 
;.6 billion dollars,· '\'ras in short-term Treasury bills and 
certificates. Despite the absolute increase of' ~ 154 million 
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Table 8 
Total Issues of,Prim€3,ry.Securities in ·the Periodl956to 1958 
1956 1957. 1958 
Federa1·Gover:nment 3~curities -41 
. . . -1.7 e.o 
State and local government ;~2' 4.7 5.7 
Corporate and Foreign 'J3o·nds 5.0 7.5 6.9 
Corporate Stocks ;;.8 ·. 4 .. o 4.2 
1-lortgages 1~.;5 12.1 . 14.,6 
Consumer Debt 
.5.4. 2.7 .. ; 
Other Bank Loans 5.4 2.7 2.8 
Trade Debt 4.4 2.,8 2.8 
Total Net Issues 
. ;5.6. ;4 .. 8 • 44.7 
(Billions) 
Source; Income and Output,· Dept •. of' Com.rnerce,. 1958 • 
. ' ' ' ' ·_ 
in Government security holdings,· there was a .2 percentage 
decline of' such holdings in relation to .total assets. 
\Je may inquire as to the. cause .of the increase in absolute · 
. . . 
holdings of'Goverpinent ~ecurities by life insurance companies.· 
~lhen we look at Charts 4 and 5 arid remember that the 1 if'e 
insurance industry is sensitive to-~hanges in the bill rate, 
we may get some i!ldics.tion.for the-underlying reasons. 
Chart 4 shows that the Trea.~ury bill rate was at an absolute 
minimum in 1958,. The rate on.long-term Government bonds, 
on the other hand, ·did not dip. much during the same period -
fall 1957 to summer 1958 ..; as ;;Jho\'m in Chart 5. 
DW'ing this time·, new savings in large amounts \'lent to life 
insurance companies.,· A large share of such funds i'las invested 
directly in the private industry a~d housing market but, in 
contrast to preceding years;: a. larger portion was used to 
purchase short ... term securities until' it was reasonably clear, 
how the recession would develop~ This seems to confirm the 
conclusion 'l'thich t·Te reached in Chapter 5, Figure 18. 
There we were concerned with· long-term Government bonds 
and portfolio adjustments to changes of the long.:.term 
interest rate. This entailed, and tore emphasized this fact, 
·a. considerable lag until sales and purchases 'i'Tould be 
completed. In the present case the lag is shorter because 
we are concerned ~Ti th the bill rate. 
An additional consideration-whY the.absol':lte Gover~ent 
security hol-dings increased in 1958 is that fewer bonds t'lere 
bought after ~l.~v.II and; ,as time i-Tent on, smaller lots of 
bonds came up for redemption,; 
* 
This chapter has been somewha.t detailed in order to correlate 
interest rate changes and life insurance portfolio adjustments 
'W'ith the behavioral equations \'lhich we established in earlier 
-chapters. 
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Looking at the general investment policy of life insurance 
. companies for the period 1950 to 1958, we may _state that, 
in relation to long-term Government bonds,_ the companies 
pursued a relatively steady co.urse and were not much influenced 
by changes in the long,..term rate. of interest. Funds l1hich vera 
released from redemptions, however, l·rere usually channelled 
into other investment sectors that yielded higher returns. 
':le also discovered "that the life insurance industry \'ras 
sensi"t.ive to changes in·the bill ra"t.e. 
In the chapters w·hich follow we shall examine portfolio 
adjustments in te.rms bf other securities upon a change 
in the rate of interest. 
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Chapter 8 
Industrial and Miscellaneous Bonds 
Industrial bonds accounted for the second largest increase per 
dollars in the security holdings of' life insurance companies 
since 1950. 
Table 9 
Holdings of Industrial and Miscellaneous Bonds by 
Life Insurance Companies 
Billions of Per .Cent 
Year: DollarsJ of Total 
1950 9.526 14.9 
1951 11.441 16.8 
1952 1~. 702 18.7 
195~ 15.527 19.7 
1954 16.926 2o.o 
1955 18.179 20.1 
1956 19.787 20.6 
1957 21.717 21.5 
1958 2;.4;9 21.8 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1959. 
In 1945, life insurance companies held only 1.9 billion 
dollars or 4.~ of total assets in industrial bonds. 
Assets: 
As recently as 1921, only 45 million dollars of life insurance 
funds were invested in industrial bonds and not until 19;5 
did the holdings of this type of bond exceed ~ of the companies• 
· total assets. While we record an· increase, both in aggregate 
amounts and as percentages of total assets, through the 
1 ~0s and early. '4o~, the maj~t inc:tease came after i1.U.II, 
. when the purchases and holdings or i.ndustrial bo.nds by life 
insurance companies began an unprecedented.rise that brought 
the "total of' such security holdings t.o 14.9% of all assets in 
1950. 
One of the significant developments since 1946 has been the 
increased use by industr~alborrowers of direct placements 
of bonds with life insurance companies. This was not a new 
practice but it had not been extensively used prior to the 
expansion period follouing ~1.\·t.II. As the tremendous o11pital 
needs of American industry were being met in the late '4os, 
it was found that di~ect placements expedited the financing 
and proved advantageous to both borrower and lender. 
Chart 6 shows, in percentages of.' total assets, the holdings 
. . 
of .industrial and mi~cellaneous bonds since 1920 • 
. The curve shows the rapid increase in the holdings of 
industrial bond~. since 1945, which 'l'le have described above. 
A detailed account of portfolio adjustments for the period 
1950 to l958 follol'rs. 
The yields on corporate bonds remained relatively stable 
f'or several months in. 1950, and thereafter tended to rise. 
~·fhile the investment demand of the private economy absorbed 
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all available life insurance funds, available in the sense of 
. . 
1955 
reasonable diversification and balancing of portfolios, the pattern 
1-1as still different in notabte r,;;spccts from what appeared to 
be the prevailing trends in 1949. ·. Although additions t'lere 
.made to the nation 1s plants and facilities on a large scale 
in 1950, the equity markets \·tere able to furnishmore net-; capital 
than in 1949. 1'he highel:' earnings (;r_ corporations also helped to 
meet the capital requirements of the business community. In any 
event, there ttas a decline in the issuance of corporate bonds 
for nett money, and an increase in the volume of. refunding. 
Consequently, life insurance'companies added less to their 
holdings of corporate bonds inl950 than in 1949.As the .rate 
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of interest was relatively constant during the year, the investment 
policy of life insurance corttpanies changed little. 
The rates charged by the larger banks. to their customers on 
prime loans rose. from about ·2%· in mid-1950 to ;% at .. the end of 
1951. Yields on high-grade corporate.bond.s.rose by about one-
. . . . . . 
' .. . . 
third percentage point during the same p~riod. Chart 5 shot'IS that 
. . 
the interest rate on high-grade corporate bonds \tas usually 
.,2 to .• 5 percentage points higher than :the rate on long-term 
Government bonds. 
The holdings of industrial onnds incre~sed by about.2 billion 
dollars during 1951 which represented a pe.rcentage increase 
in relation to total assets of' 1.9 •. This increase was financed 
by the receipt of net'l savings, . as well as by funds \'thich were 
released. from sales and re'demptions of industrials and other 
securit.ies, mainly Governments. The total acquiSitions of 
'i. 
,. . . ~-
industrial bonds amounted to ; billion dollars in 195lo 
According to the theory of chapter 5, we would expect that 
the purchases of industrial bonds increase and those of 
Government securities decline, when the rate of interest goes 
up. Considering the various risk factors by which we scrutinize 
a security we· have to conclude that, in periods of expansion, 
industrial bonds have an edge over Government bonds. 
It i~ clear that the functional risk - the possibility of 
an enterprise going into bankruptcy - is less in the case of 
Government securities compared with industrial bonds. 
However, in a period of expansion the high-grade industrials 
approach Government securities in quality as far as this 
particular risk factor is concerned. Both types of bonds, 
industrial- and Government bonds, are subject to the money 
rate risk, which is the effect on bond prices by fluctuations 
in the rate of interest. 
~·/hen we correlate the purchases of industrial bonds by life 
insurance companies with changes in the rate of interest, it 
appears that larger purchases were made when the rate 
increased.1 
Chart 5 shows that the interest rate level for bonds was 
about ~ throughout the year 1952. This was a somewhat higher 
1 Record of Life Insurance Investment, 1950 to 1958. 
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annual average than in 1951. However, the· up1vard pressure 
on long-term rates :i.n-1952 was moderated by the huge amount of 
savings seeking investments. The total assets of lif'e insurance 
. -
companies increased by 5 billion dollars and the holdings of' 
industrial. bonds by 2billiondollars. Because the rate of 
interest did not chan~e tnueh during the year, there was little 
change in the composi,tic:in 'of 'portfolios. 
In the first half of:l9531 the.demand for funds outstripped 
the supply 1-rhich caused a.. rise in .the rate- of' interest. In 
the second half we had a decline in the interest rate after 
the demand-for funds·had decreased. 
' -
The yields on corporate bonds were substantially belo1-1 their 
mid-year. peaks at the end of' the year, but somev1hat above 
the level of the previous year. 
Because the level of the rate of interest was higher in 1953 
than in 1952, w_e uould expect· an increase in the purchases 
of industrial bonds. Table 9 shows, however, that there was 
no. increase. Life insurance statistics show that the companies 
invested large amounts in industrial bonds in the first 
half of the year. During the second half the main portion 
of the available funds was invested_ in Treasury bills until 
it v1as clear -how fong _·the contraction would last whi eli . began 
inJune/July 1953. 
Recovery \·ras under ~tay in 1954 after the moderate decline 
of :195.?. The yields Oil corporate. bonds declined steadily 
. . ' '· 
during the first qUarter, to alevel of 2.85% at the end:of 
March. Chart 5 shows that the rates increased Only moderately 
during the second half of the year. The levelof' the rate of 
interest \tas ab~ut on the same average for 1954 as for 1952. 
l'he total assets increased ·by 6 billion dollars during the year 
\'Jhile the holdings of bonds by life insurance companies. went 
up by 1.5 billion dollars.· 
.·_The . .rate on lorig-term securities increased by about-l percentage 
point during 1955. After. ·an incr.ease in the first qUarter of 
1955, the yi_elds on corporate bonds. tt~re generally stable . 
in the second quarte.r and inorea:s·e~;t slightly in the third and 
. . : . . . . 
fourth quarters. \lhile the rate moved .somewhat belo\'1 the ,~ 
level in 1954, it passed the .?% .mark ·in 1955 to remain rather 
constant for the rest of the year •. 
The total holdings of corporate. bonds increased by 1.2 billion 
· . dollars l-Thich \'las the smallest .increase sin.ce 1950. The 
percentage increase was even less remarkable, from 20J~ at 
the end of 1954 to 20.1% at the end of 1955. Considering the 
. fact that the year 1955 established new .records in production, 
employment, and coris'l.Ullptl.on, thia result ·is some-v1hat puzzling. 
Ho\'1ever, the ejCplane.tion could be q~te simple, namely, that 
other investment opportunities, particularly mortgages, were 
more favorable than those in industrial bonds. 
l"li th over-~11 demands for credit quite strong in 1956, 
interest rates rose during the year. The increase· l'l'as especially, 
marked in the long-term area, where private debt expansion was 
almost as large as in 1955. The rate on corporate bonds rose 
tt'l'ice as much in 1956 as in 1955~ Because the yield differential 
bett-reen industrial bonds and other investment opportunities 
l-tas largely eliminated by .. the increase in the long-term rate, 
vre t-rould expect larger purchases of industrial bonds for 1956 
compared uith 1955. The increase was 1.6billion dollars 
compared t'lith 1.2 billion in :the previous year. 
* 
i·le stated in the previous chapter that outputs and employment 
· set riet'l' records in 1957 .. 
The rate on long-term bpnds.passed,.for the first time since 
1950, the 4% mark. -.\s the spread b~tween the industrial bond 
rate and other yields i .. ras again decreased, t'l'e vtould expect 
an increase in the holdings of the former. Comparing the 
increase in 1957 t-Ti th that of the previous year, t-te had 2 
billion dollars in 1957 and 1,.6 billion in 1956. 
* 
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At the beginning of'l958 the economy was in a period of recession. 
Chart 4 shows a drastic decline of the bi~l rate in comparison 
~o the slight dip of the long-term bond rate in Chart 5. 
Apparently this was due to the fact that corporations, as well 
as State and local governments, continued to issue large 
volumes of bonds. 
Because the interest rate average for 1958 was about the same 
as for 1957, we would not expect much change in the holdings 
or industrial bonds. 
The increase in holdings during 1958 was 1.7 billion dollars 
compared with 2 billion in the preceding year. 
Since 1950, the long-term bond rate increased by about one 
half of one per cent, as shO\m in Chart 5. Vte also notice 
a close correlation between industrial bonds and long-term 
Government securities; the spread continuously increasing 
and decreasing but always within certain limits. 
For the period 1950 to 1958, the spread decreased slightly 
which resulted in a decelerated decrease of Government 
bonds in comparison with the purchasing rate of industrials. 
Chart 6 shows that the slope or the rising portion of the 
curve decreased after 195' to flatten out after 1955 for 
a short stretch, only to rise again, but at a decreased 
marginal rate. 
We can repeat the conclusion of the last chapter that life 
insurance companies invested new savings and released 
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:runds in those securities 'l'lhich were most f'avorable at the 
governing rate of' interest. Taking this conclusion and 
applying it to mortgages~ we shall see in chapter 9 
why this security sho\'IS the largest increase for the 
period 1950 to 1958. 
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p~pter.9 
Mo;r;t&~q;e~ 
The mortgage market sh_O\'I'S 'a trflmelldous boom sin~e the end of 
W.W.II ... I~_the five.years, 1946.t() 1950, life inst.trance companies 
inve_sted lll;Or~ t!Jta.n 16_ billion. 4ollaz;s. in new mortgages and since 
1950, anotber_2~ bi~lion· dollars. While such fipancing includes. 
all types of mortgages,~--. far_m, c.~~er9ial, multiple housing, 
. ' ' 
residential hou~ing - the preponderance was in homes and apartment 
houses. r-
Mortgage financing appeals to ~ife insurance companies for 
several re_e.sonsJ 
(1) abundant security, in the form of the_real property; 
(2) e.ttr,active inc,ome{ _ 
(;) a.ttract~ve maturi!-ies; 
.. {4) geographic diversification.; 
(5) diversifi9ation of. credit risks; 
(Q.). a. ;rel_a.tive hi~ degree of liquidity; 
(7) a price level hedge; 
(8) little fluctuations in the market. 
~ropt¥"1Y ,s.elected rnortg~e loans_ provide an l;l.bund,ance of security. 
To be~ att-ractive i:n:vestment, regardles~ of. type,_a mortgage 
loan mu.~t ,qff~ 1:1, r.eturn _which com_par"es f~vo.rably with the yield 
that can b.e o,P_ta.i~ed_ by alternative opport~ties,. Generally, the 
spread in net income between mortgages and high-quality bonds 
should be about }/4 to 1 l/4%. :PArticularly during the latter 
. . . ' - . ~ . . . . . ~ -
'4os, the return available on mortgages was so much greater 
than that on bonds that they became very attractive to life 
insurance investors. And, as the increased purchases by life 
insurance companies show, continued to be attractive in the 
'50s. The larger spread, combined with the great demand for 
mortgage funds resulting from the housing boom, explains partly 
the substantial holdings in mortgages by lif,e insurance companies. 
It is interesting to trace life insurance mortgage holdings 
during the last 4o years. 
Ohart 7 shows a peak in the 120s, representing holdings of 
about 43% of total assets in mortgages. During the •;os 
mortgages became quite a burden to life insurance companies 
when, at a time, defaults of approximately 2 billion dollars 
occured. Therefore, there \'las a substantial decline _in 
mortgage holdings until 1945 when the life insurance industry 
held less than 20% of to~l assets in mortgages. Since 1945, 
however, we have this spectacular increase in mortgage 
holdings which we reported.l 
The main event in 1950 was that regulation X was set into 
operation., This regulation established the maximum amounts 
that could be borrowed, maximum maturity terms, and minimum 
amortization periods in the mortgage market. Apparently, the 
1 Records of Life Insurance Investments, ibid., 1952-195;. 
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Ohart 7 
Mortgage Bonds Owned by u.s. Life Insurance Companies 
1920 - 1958 
Per Cent of Assets 
50 
jO 
~------~------~~------~------~--~----?-~----~--------r-------, 1920 925 19)0 19)5 194o 1945 1950 
Source: Derived from data in the Spectator Year Book 
regulation had little effect on the amount of real estate credit 
extended during 1950.,At that time, the amount of total mortgage 
debt outstanding in the country on small family dwellings was 
about 44 billion dollars which meant an increase of 7 billion 
1955 
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dollars compared \'rith: 1949. 
Table 10 
Holdings of' Mortgages by Life Insurance Companies 
Years Billions of Per Cent 
Dollars: of Total ll.ssets: 
1950 16.102 25.1 
1951 19.514 28 • .; 
1952 21.251 29.0 
1953 2).)22 29.7 
1954 25.976 )0.7 
1955 29.445 )2.6 
1956 )2.989 34.4 
1957 35.236 34.8 
1958 37.062 34.4 
Source: Lif'e Insurance Fact Book, 1959. 
* 
During 1951, 1if'e insuran¢e companies increased their assets 
by 4 billion dollars .• As Government securities were decreased 
by e 2 billion, 6 billion dollars were. available for ne\'1 
investments. Of this wmount, about 50% or 3 billion dollars, 
uas used to purchase:•mortgages. 
Although the rate onlong-term bonds increased by.about one-
third of' a percentage point during the year, the demand in the 
housing market· pushed up the rates on mortgages. even more. 
For example, the gross return on city mortgage loans was about 
4.17% in 1951 which re~resented a net of ;.5~ after deduction 
of all costs. The average turnover rate in years was about 11. 
With slight variations, and with the exception of the depression 
years, mortgage delinquencies never exceeded 1% of the total 
dollar volume of loans outstanding. 
* 
Regulation X was .suspended.in 1952. The inc:J;"ease in real estate 
credit during the year was high, although somewhat less than 
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in the two preceding years. The life insurance industry increased 
its holdings of mortgages by about 2 billion dollars. 
During the year, the interest rate on long-term bonds increased 
slightly but, at the same time, the net rate on mortgages increased 
to ~.64.%, retaining the original spread between the two types 
of securities. 
The reason for the decline in the purchases of mortgages during the 
year seems to have been the unattractive rates in VA loans, which 
carried only a gross rate of 4% compared with an average of 
4.22%. 
* 
Residential building in 195~ shared in the general expansion 
of the economy early in the year and then declined during the 
spring and summer. Total real estate credit increased substantially 
during the year, viz., by 9.6 billion dollars compared 'l'rith 
~ :r' 
. . ~- .. 
·~. 
.. ':0. 
8.8 billion in 1952. 
Li~e insurance companies absorbed 2~ or about 2 billion dollars 
o~ this increase. The long-term bond rate climbed beyond the 
~ mark and eliminated some o~ the spread between bond and 
mortgage yields. However, the net mortgage rate increased also 
to ;.7~. 
* 
The residential housing market was strong during 1954. Some 
1.2 million new dwelling units \'lere started compared with 
1.1 million in each o~ the preceding years and a record of 1.4 
million in 1950. A major factor in the rise in housing 
construction 'l'las the increased availability of mortgage 
funds on attractive terms to borro'l'rers. 
'I'he life insurance holdings of mortgages increased by 2.5 
billion dollars which represented a percentage of ;o.7 of 
total assets., Approximately tl'lo-thirds of this increase 
were Government-guaranteed mortgages. 
The rate of interest on long-term bonds declined to an 
average just belo\"1 ;% while the net mortgage rate increased 
further to ;.8~, which increased the spread between bonds 
and mortgages. 
The long-term bond rate remained rather constant during 1955 
averaging about ~. The mortgage rate, however, increased again • 
· .. · 
.. - -,;.-·. --· ---- . 
·:: 
... :· 
. 
~ . 
. ~· 
10; 
,;--
·. 
A gross return of 4.52% could be obtained which, after 
deduction of costs, resulted.in e. net rate of 5.96.% representing 
a spread of .95 between high-quality bonds and mortgageso 
The tot~l holdings of mortgages by li~e insurance companies 
increased by the largest amount yet, namely '·5 billion dollars. 
Resfdential mortgage debt outstanding, on 1-4 family houses, 
rose by 11.1 billion dollars during 1956, compared with an 
increase of 12.4 billion in the previous year. The slowdown 
in the rate of expansion was, according to several statements,1 
entirely due to the VA and FHA components. These Government-
underwritten. mortgages, with interest rate ceilings, became 
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less attractive to investors as the general level of yields rose. 
Life insurance companies could earn a net rate of 4.04% on 
mortgages which uas slightly higher than the 1955 rate 
but .only_· .55% above the long-term bond rate. 
Consequently, some funds were shifted to industrial bonds 
as expected. 
* 
The interest rate on long-term industrial bonds continued' 
to rise during 1957, passing the 4%-mark around June. 
The net rate on mortgages increased only to 4.15%. Because 
1 Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 1956; 
Record of Life Insurance Investments, 1956. 
the spread betvree~ industrial . bonds and mortgages was largely 
eliminated, there \'Tas a decline in the purchases of' the latter 
to 2.2 billion dollar~ in 1957 compared uith ;.5 billion in 
.the previous year~ The purchases of' industrial bonds increased 
considerably duririg 1957. 
. . 
* 
The holdings of' mortgages increased by 1.,8 billion dollars 
during 1958. Because assets rose by 6 billion dollars ue 
shovld not.be surprised about th~ drop in the percentage 
holdings from ;4.,8 to.;4.,4%. Other securities, having more 
favorable returns, absorbed the majority of available f'tmds. 
The reason for the decline in mortgage holdi~s tV'aS the 
pegged rate in VA loans, t-thich put such mortgages at a 
competitive disadvantage t'lith o:ther mortgages .• 
Looldng at the period~l950 to 1958, it seems apparent that 
the life insurance industry behaved according to expectations. 
',·then the spread bett'leen mortgages and bonds increased, the 
life insurance companies bought .mainly mortgages while 
relatively more bonds t·rere purchased IV'hen the spread decreased. 
Such behavior, hot1eve~, can .only be related to net'l and released 
funds. The adjustment reaction was rathel" slow in the case 
of' securities.uhich. had already been acquired. This may be 
entirely due to the relative large portfolios vrhich life 
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insurance companiee ·administer and the resulting degree 
of inflexibility. 
In conclusion we can say that mortgage holdings constituted the 
·largest share of total. assets of the life insurance industry 
in the postwar period., 
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Chapter 10 
State,. Provincial, and Municipal Bonds. 
The investments of life insurance companies in the obligations 
of political subdidvisions has increased in recent years, 
although the total of such securities held is less than it 
was in the late 1,?0s and early 14os. 
Table 11 
Holdings of State, Provincial, and Municipal Bonds by 
Life Insurance Companies 
Year: Billions of Per Cent of 
Dollars: Total Assets: 
1950 1.547 2.4 
1951 1.7;6 2.5 
1952 1.767 2.4 
195.? 1.99? 2.6 
1954 2.549 ;.1 
1955 2.696 ;.o 
1956 ; .. on ;.1 
1957 ,?.16,? ;.1 
1958 ;.510 ;.; 
Sources Life Insurance Fact Book, 1959. 
While the holdings of State, provincial, and local bonds -
which we shall call shortly locals - have represented between 
2 and 8.% of total assets for the last ;o years, they have 
I_ - - ----~ --- ---- ------------ - --------- -
varied considerably from ye.ar to year in amount. In 194o, 
~re have a peak of ·2.4 billion dollars ·in th~ holdings of. 
locals by life i)!).sura.nce companies "rhich, represented 7. 7%. 
of' total assets. During the war, little ne\'1 financing of 
local projectswas carried'out:-and theholdings declined 
until in· 1946 they "rere less. than_ one billion dollars. 
'. - . -·. 
The absolute ho_ldings of locals a.tnouri.ted .. to 1.5 billion 
. dollars in 1950. In the first 'half of the year, the 
rates ~n locals remairied rather steadY~·ln the second 
- ·. ·. ' . . 
half a sharp decline\in yields set:inwhich reflect~d the 
increased demand· for ·tax-exempt sec uri ties resulting f.rotn 
higher income ta~es. 
About 200 million dollars \1ere added ·t.o the holdings of' locals 
during 1951~ 
New offerings of local.s· 11rere unusli~lly heavy late in 1952. 
Yields advanced . by .about o~1e...;.third of one pe~centage point 
tili the end of' the year. ~he total holdings incr.eased by only 
jOmilliondollars. 
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The spread which existed between u'!s. Government bonds and 
high-grade municipal bonds in 1951 1 and which amounted to about 
j%, decreased constantly until 195' ~d was cdmpletely eliminated 
in July of that year. Life insurance companies responded to 
the elimination of the spread and purchased seven times as 
many locals in 195' as in the preceding year. 
Not much can be reported of either 1954 or 1955. 
* 
Compared with 1955, the rates on locals rose more .than twice 
in 1956. The spread between long-term Government securities 
and locals increased again as shown in Chart 5. 
Little can be added as far as 1957 and 1958 are concerned. 
Looking at the period 1950 to 1958, w·e may state that life 
insurance companies reacted to changes in rates as we have 
outlined in preceding chapters. 
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Chapter 11 
Public Utility Bonds 
Th~ public utility f'ield is a broad'class:i.f'ication and Cah. be 
~roke~ dotm into categol"ies such as .electric po\'ler and light, 
telephone, gas, etc •• The capital demands of utility companies 
'i:tere tremendous in the postwar. period e,nd because of' lot'l 
capital tUrnover and regulation of the industry, the funds 
. . 
:f'or expansion had to be raised chiefly externally. Because 
o:f' steady earnings, utility bonds a.ppealto life insurance 
. investors and large quanti ties of such bonds \'[ere purchased 
since the end of ::1 .. \'1. I.I. 
Today, the life insurance industry provides more than half 
of' the long-terni financing needs o:f' atl utility,companies.l 
An aha.lysis of the holdings o:f' public utilities in. 1955 sho'tred 
that 55% •·rere in securities of potrer .and light .companies, 
2~~ in gas utilities, 18% in. C(;)Uln1unica~iorls, and water companies, 
' '· ,._ ' .· 
. local-transit companies,. etc~~ made up the relna:i.nd,er o:f' the 
utility bond portfolio~ 
. . 
Looking at yearly acquisitiohs, 'I'Te have· e. rathei' stE?i1dy and 
uninterrupted increase of. :f'rom l!oo ·.to 8QO million dollars · 
per annum since 1950.· 
Although. the long-'terni rate of interest rose by~ for the period 
1950 to 1958, the life insUrance· indu~tr;,r did not chanze its. 
1 Record.of Life insurance.Investments, i~id.,, 1950 to 1958. 
investment policy in respeQt to public utility bonds uhich 
. . 
it held in portfolios •. Just as, in previous ca.ses, the companies 
kept their bonds until. ma~~ity 1-1hi~h \'Tas :; stabilizing factor 
to the public utility !lond market. 
Table12 
»oldings of Public Utiiity Bonds by Life Insurance 
Companies 
.Year: Billions of' Per Cent of 
Dollars: Total .Assets: 
1950 .10.587 16.5 
1951 . 11.2;}5 16.4 
1952 11.955 16.; 
1955 12.827 16.; 
1954 1;).511. 1·6.0 
1955 ,1;.968 15.5 
1956 14.520 15.1 
1957 15.252 15.1 
1958 15.958 14.8 
Source; Life. Insurance Fact Book, 1959. 
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Chapter 1,2 
Railroad.Bonds 
Life insurance fun~s have. al:-'a.ya been a si~ificant factor in 
financing the nation's railroads.l In the early 1900's about 
one-third of all life insurance funds. were invested in rail-
road bonds, Today, even though life. insurance company holdings 
of railroad bonds account for rhe smallest proportion of total 
assets since the pioneer days of railroading, they represent the 
largest share of the railroads' fw1ded debt ever held.l 
Tabl~ 1' shows that although the percentage share of bonds 
has steadily declined since 1950, the absolute holdings increased. 
Life insurance companies todaYhold nearly one-half of the 
nation's entire funded railroad debt, compared with about 
one-sixth in 1920. 
During the ''Os, a large number of railroads became bankrupt 
and had to be financially reorganized. Debts were scaled down 
in the process of readjustment but while inferior securities 
in comparison with the ones initially held had to be taken 
in exchange, those life insurance companies which held on to 
their railroad investments found that, as a whole, the investments 
worked out quite we11.2 In other words, it has proven to be sound 
investment policy to ride out the storms that are created by 
economic cycles, provided a senior security has been held. 
1 
2 Life Insurance Fact Books, 1950 to 1959. Record of Life Insurance Investments, 1950 to 1958. 
' ." ~ "') . - ' • .. •. .... ·· ..... •"')' 
The absolute holdings of railroadbonds were about ;.2 billion 
dollars in 1950. This figure increased to ;.9 billion in 1955 
and has declined since to ;.8 billion. As percentage of total 
assets, railroad bonds accounted for.5% in 1950 but declined 
to ;5.6% in 1958 because of the rapid increase in total assets. 
Because railroads are a dying industry, at least this seems to 
be the general opinion, there is not much sense in correlating 
portfolio adjustments with interest rate changes. Only a small 
n; 
portion of the available funds has been used to purchase railroad 
bonds. Diversification, custom, may be some reasons why life 
insurance companies bother to hold railroad bonds at all. 
Table 1; 
Holdings of Railroad Bonds by Life Insurance Companies 
Year: Billions of Percentage of 
Dollars: Total Assets: 
1950 ;.187 5.0 
1951 ;.;07 4.9 
1952 ;.545 4.8 
1955 ;.64; 4.7 
1954 ;.757 4.5 
1955 3.912 4.; 
1956 ;.877 4.o 
1957 ;.a6; ;.8 
1958 ;.84; ;.6 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1959. 
Chapter 15 
·stocks 
In 1958, stock holdings ·amounted to 4.1 billion dollars. Until 
recently, stock investments did not bulk large in life insurance 
portfolios. In 190,, the holdings in stocks were about 7% of 
total assets. :'lith the prohibition of investments in stocks in 
the State of Ne;-1 York, these securities vanished from life 
insurance portfolios., amounting to 56 million dollars in 1922. 
In 1928, the lat-r \'ta.s changed and Neu York again permitted 
•investments in qualified preferred stocks. Although this 
had an irnmediat'e effect on the purchases of~ stocks, the 19'0 
holdings ;>~ere sti.ll less than .5 billion dollars. 
The greatest increase in stock investments ee.me in the middle 
and late '4os when the total cif'. stock ho~dings rose from 652 
million dollars in 194' to ,.6 billion in 1955. 
Today, the greater pa:l:'t of investments in sto.cks is in common 
. . 
stock,. in contrast to ten years ago \'lhen the major portion 
uas in preferred stocks. The change ~is. due to the fact that 
the la\'l in the State of Ne\'1 York i'las a.mended.l,n 1951 and 1957, 
to permit life· insurance COII!.panies to hold limited amounts 
of their investments in commonstocks. However, it should 
. ·. ; . . . 
be pointed out .that the increase in stock holdings, as shown 
in Ta.ble 14, is partly due to.valuatioriadjust:inents. 
·Unlike most bonds, \'lhich are carried in financial. statements 
at amortized cost, stocks are usually quoted at year-end 
market values. Effective \·lith 1957, most preferred stocks 
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were also permitted to be carried at stabilized values. 
'ile have experienced .the p}le.nomenon that the spread bet,-reen 
bonds and stocks has been eliminated in the preceding years. 
It is commonly thought that this is the result of creeping 
inflation,. However, as indicated, life insurance companies 
are barred from holding more than a certain pe~centage of 
their investments in common stocks which contributed to the 
very selective holdings of only high-quality stocks in life 
insurance portfolios. 
Table 14 
Holdings of Stocks by Life Insurance Companies. 
Year: Billions of Per Cent of 
Dollars: Total Assets: 
1950 2.105 ;.; 
1951 2.221 ;.; 
1952 2.446 
'·' 
1955 2.575 5·5 
1954 5.268 }.9. 
1955 5.6;5 4.0 
1956 . 5 .. 505 5.7 
1957 ;.;91 5-5 
1958 4.109 5.8 
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book, 1959. 
Chapter 14 
Real :Estate, Policy Loans, and Miscellaneous Assets •. 
Real estate hold1ngs o~ life insurance companies amounted to 
;s billion dollars in ,19571 ·\'thich l·Tas a continuation o~ ·the steady 
grouth in that particular asset in the postt<~ar. period. This 
grot.,th has been primarily in colTl!llercial. arid industrial property 
•· 
\'there many buildings have been acqUired on a lease-back 
arrangement. 
Policy loans '"'ere relat-ively constant during the last 9 years • 
. ,
As a ratio o~ total assets, they declined ~rom 18}~ in 19:?:? 
·to a lot.,r of ;.6J'o in 1955. 
. . 
!'!iscellaneoU3 assets consist mainly of cash,. due and preferred 
premium payments. 
Obviously,. the items enumerated here, have little to do ;·rith 
changes in the rate of interest. 
. - .:• 
The a:inount o~ cash t;rhi..ch is held may rise in a. period of recession 
but the. increase l<~ill· not be large. At least for t.he last tt·to 
recessions, 1954 and 1958,. 11e cannot observe any change in cash 
other than relative incoae adjustments. 
The holdings o~ real estate, cash, and miscellaneous assets, 
which t-tere 2.6 billion dollars in 1950 and 4.6 billion in 1958, 
al-e correlated t'lith the grovtth -in life insurance assets rather 
than t·li th changes . in the rate o~ interest. 
Ohap1;.er 15 
Earnings, Gains, and Losses 
Life insurance companies have absorbed surprisingly few net 
losses on the disposal of' .securities. Not so surprising, 
however, if we keep in mind that a strong equity cushion exists 
beneath most of the securities whi·ch are held. It is the better 
part of wi.sdom to look .forward with confidence to a recovery 
of va1ues in due course. As: long-term investors with a stable 
cash flow, life insurance companies have not been panicked into 
sales during depressed business conditions. Thus for the entire 
period 1929 to 1956, gains on disposal of bonds exceeded losses 
by approximately 561 million dollars. In only nine years have 
losses exceeded gains, and in no year have net losses exceeded 
48 million. Most of the losses on disposal of bonds were incurred 
in the railroad field, but the losses were only a small portion 
of the interest earnings obtained on the bonds. Thus, for the 
period 1929 to 1956, the interest earnings on railroad bonds 
amounted to ~.2 billion dollars, a.s compared with lo8 million 
dollars of net losses. 
Life insurance statistics demonstrate the essentially long-ter-m 
character of life insurance investing. Although the net gains 
on the disposal of securities loom large in absolute terms, 
actually they amount to only ~ of the volume of interest earnings 
on bonds over this period. The general policy of the companies 
of continuing investment, irrespective of the level of interest 
rates, and of holding securities until maturity, has served to 
1 
'• 
place great emphasis on yield and to minimize the importance 
of gains. Table 16 shows the earnings for 18 large companies. 
The Table gives an inte:resting picture of the rise and decline 
of earnings on securities from 1929 to 1956. At times, the rate 
on bonds 1-1hich life ins_ura.nce companies customarily assumed to 
be ;%, dropped considerably below that figure. 
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The earnings on total investments for all life insurance companies 
are given in Table 15 for the period 1950 to 1958. 
The-rate of return on life insurance investments is an important 
factor in the calculation of costs. In 1958, the net rate of 
earnings was ;.85'fo before taxes, compared with ;.75fo in 1957. 
Despite the generally higher rates of return on life insurance 
investments in the '50s as compared 1-Tith the 14os, the average 
net earning rate after taxes for the yea:rs 1950 to l957 of ;.18.% 
was only little higher thB.n the average of ;.14% for the 14os. 
In the decade 194o to 1950, the net rate was high at the beginning 
and low at the end; while in the 1950 1s-the rate was low at the 
beginning and high at the end of the period. Perhaps, after 
- -
adding the 1958, 1959, and 1960 results to the average, l-Ie may. 
get a larger differential ba'tween t;he two decades. 
It is further evidence of' the long..orange vie'l'r of the life 
insurance industry that the yields rose only slowly since ~-l.il.II. 
Life insurance companies could have obtained higher returns 
if they had sold more oftheir'Goyernment bonds without 
suffering capital losses prior to the Accord of' 1951;. ·It is 
obvious that the portfolio changes are gradual and take 
a considerable period of time. 
Table 15 
Rate of Returri ori.Inve~ted.Life Insurance Funds 
1950 :' 1958 
All Companies 
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Year: Rate Before Federal 
Rate Af'ter Federal 
. Income Tax: Income Tax: 
·.· 
1950 ;.13% ;.oO% 
1951 ;.18 2.98 
1952 ; .. 2~: ;.07 
1955 ;.;6 ;.15 
.. 1954 . ;.46 ;.24 
1955 ;.51 ;.23 
1956 ;.6; ;.;; 
1957 ;.73 ;.44 
1958 ;.85 N.A.. 
Source: Life .Insurance Fact Boqk, 1959. 
Table 16, 
Rates of Return on Bonds, Pfd.-, and Common Stocks 
. . 1929 "':' 1956 
·EighteenLife Insurance Companies 
Year: J3onds# · P£'d. 
. Common: 
• 
1929 . 4.7~ 4.7Cf/o 
4.68% 
19}0 4.72 4.96 4.68 
1931 4.65 . 4:.97 
4.44 
1932 4.56 '4.75 3.34 
19:?3 4 .. ;o 4.05 
2.89 
19}4 4.12 4.53 3.18 
:1.935 ;.82 4.24 
3.09 
19;6 ;.63 5.86 . 3·4o 
. 1937 3~51 5.67 
; .. 57 
1938 3-35 4.82 ;.55 
1939 ; 7.2 4.8; 
3.69 
.·:; 
194o ;.:26 . 4.74 3.90 
1941 . ;.16 4.82 
. ;.92 
1942 3.18 5.o; ; .. 95 
1943 ;.oo 4. 72: 4.05 
1944 2.9; 5·53 4.53 
1945: 2~86 4.68 
4.70 
1946 2.74 . 4~25 4~47 
1947 . 2,.74 4.22 4.77 
1948 .2.81 4.47 5.06 
1949 2.;88 .. '4.13 
5.22 
1950 2.92 4 .. 25 
6.30 
1951 2.94 . 4.23 
6.32 
1952 3•07. .4.;3 
6.24 
1953 ;.16 4.32 
6.;7 
1954 7.. 25 4.33 
. 6.69 
,:;. 
1955 7•70 4.31 
6.69 . 
1956 ;.;7 . 4.37 7~25 
.. 
\1eighted Average. 
1.929 - 1956 }:, 17 4.51 .5.79 
Source: Derived·from Record of Life Insurance Investments; 
Life Insura}lc·e Fact Books; Spectator Year Boolcs. 
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